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The Death of Strict Liability
PETER M. GERHARTt
INTRODUCTION

It is axiomatic that the field of non-intentional torts is
divided into two domains: negligence liability and strict
liability. This view of accident law is so well ingrained as to
be well nigh impregnable.1 At the level of doctrine, it3
permeates the new Restatement of Torts, 2 torts casebooks,
and treatises. 4 At the level of theory, a vigorous scholarly
debate probes the relative domains, and the strengths and
weaknesses, of negligence and strict liability-a debate that
fuels both the consequentialist literature of law and

t Professor, Case Western Reserve School of Law. I thank Justin Thompson for
valuable research assistance. Kenneth S. Abraham and Keith Hylton have
made valuable comments on an earlier version of the article.
1. As an exception to this statement, George Fletcher has proposed a theory
of reciprocal risk that purports to get away from the dichotomy between
negligence and strict liability by supplying an analytical structure that
supports, but is not controlled by, the dichotomy. George P. Fletcher, Fairness
and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REV. 537 (1972) [hereinafter Fletcher,
Fairness& Utility]. His theory is, however, highly influenced by the distinction
between strict liability and negligence liability, as is evident in his subsequent
work. See George P. Fletcher, Corrective Justicefor Moderns, 106 HARv. L. REV.
1658, 1661-62 (1993) [hereinafter Fletcher, Corrective Justice] (reviewing JULES
COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992)). I comment on this view of strict liability
infra text accompanying notes 70-74.
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM §§ 20-25, at
276-416 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
3. I have found no casebook that fails to honor the division between
negligence and strict liability or that seeks to present strict liability as an
application of negligence principles. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (7th ed. 2000); MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN &
MICHAEL D. GREEN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed.
2006); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER,
WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS (11th ed. 2005).
4. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 941 (2000).

245

246

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

economics 5 and the deontic literature of corrective justice. 6
Despite the dominance of the negligence principle, tort law
is commonly perceived to contain "pockets" of liability that
are thought to be strict.
Yet tort law appears to be struggling with a mirage. As
I demonstrate in this Article, strict liability as a doctrinal
or analytical category of accident law is dying, and should
be absorbed within negligence liability. And so it should;
strict liability is an unjustified and superfluous doctrinal
container for addressing non-intentional harms. All of the
legitimate "work" of strict liability can be-and is beingdone better under the negligence regime by asking whether
the injurer made reasonable decisions about activity-based
matters. Accordingly, strict liability is a doctrinal shadow,
and the attempt to perpetuate the notion of strict liability is
an analytical failure that seeks to prove what the law is
thought to be, rather than what the law manifestly is. The
emperor of strict liability doctrine has no clothes.
I have two goals in this Article. The first is to support
my claim that strict liability is on its death bed. In brief, I
contend that courts should determine responsibility for
accidents by asking both the traditional reasonableness
question-namely, whether the defendant took due careand also an activity-based reasonableness questionnamely, whether the defendant's activity-based decisions
were reasonable. This latter inquiry encompasses a
determination of whether the injurer's decisions were the
kind of decision that ought to be the basis of judicial
intervention-the relevancy determination-and whether
the relevant activity-level decisions were reasonably made.

5. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004). For a recent analysis of negligence versus strict

liability in connection with controlling medical mistakes, see Noam Sher, New
Differences Between Negligence and Strict Liability and their Implications on
Medical MalpracticeReform, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 335 (2006).
6. See, e.g., JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 371 (1992) ("Some cases of
strict liability are covered by the principle of corrective justice because they are
really cases of fault liability ....
Sometimes innocent or justifiable conduct can
be contrary to the constraints imposed by the rights of others."); ERNEST J.
WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAw 187-90 (1995) (showing that strict liability is
inconsistent with corrective justice, but then arguing that liability for
abnormally dangerous activities is nonetheless consistent with corrective
justice).
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Although this will abolish strict liability in name, it will
preserve the present function of strict liability-which is to
allow courts to find that a defendant who imposes
unreasonable harm on others by an activity-based decision
is responsible for that harm.
The activity-based negligence approach allows courts to
assign and withhold responsibility in ways that comport
with the normative, fault-based foundations of accident law.
It also makes transparent the decisional factors that are
relevant when determining responsibility, eschewing
reliance on types of activities-such as blasting-or tests
without meaning-such as ultrahazardous activities. It
creates a doctrine of reasonableness that is coherent and
comprehensive and that reduces reliance on "pockets" of
special rules that are based on empty criteria. Finally, the
approach I advocate connects the law with those who must
obey the law. The relevant command under the analysis I
propose would be to "make reasonable decisions as to the
quality of care you use and the frequency, location, time,
and method of your activities." This tells people to follow
their common sense intuitions of reasonableness when
making decisions and to avoid reducing their investment in
productive activities merely out of fear that their
activity
'7
will later be labeled as "abnormally dangerous.
My second goal is to speculate on the implications of my
analysis for understanding legal reasoning and the
development of the law. By showing how the "strict
liability" cases could have had the same outcome under an
activity-based reasonableness test, I am essentially
asserting that the legal reasons ascribed to the outcome of

7. Although I am not directly arguing that strict liability cases have had
wrong outcomes, it is likely that some busy courts have been mislead by the
rubric of abnormally dangerous activity to impose liability when, under the
analysis advanced here, doing so would be unjustified. But even when cases had
correct outcomes, the damage to the legal system from unjustified legal
reasoning is significant. The law should strive for a more accurate and
revealing match between reasons and results, between analysis and outcomes.
This is not unimportant. The law is meant to guide analysis by private lawyers
as they advise their clients and this cannot be done if the law holds on to
unworkable and unrevealing tests for applying strict liability. The legal system
undermines its own legitimacy and coherency if it sustains categories that are
disingenuous and hollow. Legal theory is distorted when it is made to address a
law that simply is not there. The law should strive to align its doctrine with the
justification for legal intervention.
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cases were not, in fact, an accurate reflection of the
justificational basis for the decision. The reasons could not
provide a workable way of developing the law, a
transparent way of describing what the judges were
thinking, or a basis for justifying the decision to apply or
withhold "strict liability." I therefore challenge the notion
that judges reason their way to an outcome when they
determine whether to apply strict liability.
In place of a theory of legal reasoning, I posit a theory
of intuitional decisionmaking. Under this theory, judges
reach results from intuition, not from a process of analytical
thought; they then seek to explain their intuition with
reasons. Where judges' intuition suggested that the injurer
should be legally responsible despite the injurer's exercise
of due care, judges developed a category of liability without
fault to explain their results. This was simply a default
position, however, adopted because judges lacked the
analytical apparatus to understand the activity-based
reasonableness concept. Now that the appropriate
analytical apparatus is available, the need for that default
position is gone and judges can employ that analytical
apparatus to justify their imposition of liability for activitybased decisions.
Because I am exploring fault-based liability, I do not
grapple with theories of distributive justice, where the only
fault that can be assigned is the failure of the injurer to pay
reparations. Accordingly, I put aside theories of loss
distribution-theories that legal responsibility should be
assigned to the party that can best absorb or distribute the
loss. 8 Such distributive theories might justify a separate
doctrine of strict liability, although they hardly support the

8. See Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., Public Law Perspectives on a
Private Law Problem-Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 641, 642
(1964) (carrying loss distribution ideas to the legislative arena); Fleming James,
Jr., ContributionAmong Joint Tortfeasors:A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L.
REV. 1156, 1156 (1941); Fleming James, Jr., Last Clear Chance: A Transitional
Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704, 716 (1938); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF
ACCIDENTS 39-67 (1970) (discussing and analyzing various loss spreading
rationales); Dix W. Noel, Strict Products Liability Compared with No-Fault
Automobile Accident Reparations, 38 TENN. L. REV. 297 (1971). More recent
attempts to revive enterprise liability by emphasizing the distributive value of
shifting costs to enterprises is found in Gregory C. Keating, Strict Liability and
the Mitigation of Moral Luck (Univ. S. Cal. Ctr. in Law, Econ. & Org., Research
Paper No. C06-12), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=923574.
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current strict liability doctrine. 9 But law and legal theory
have gravitated toward theories of individual moral
responsibility, the arc of loss distribution theory has
peaked, and loss distribution is no longer generally thought
to provide a justification of accident law as it is or as it
should be. 10
I also delimit the subject matter of this Article. I deal
only with that branch of tort law that supposes that nofault doctrines apply to abnormally dangerous activities, as
if we could justify liability without fault on the basis of an
9. Under current doctrine, whether strict liability applies depends on the
dangerousness of the activity. See infra text accompanying notes 40-52. Loss
distribution theories suggest that responsibility should be allocated to the actor
who can best distribute the risk, and this need not coincide with the
dangerousness of the activity.
10. Modern products liability law is no longer seen to be based on loss
spreading rationale. See, MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
51-58 (2006) [hereinafter GEISTFELD, PRODUCTS LIABILITY] (explaining why
producer responsibility is not justified by insurance considerations);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20(a)-(b), at 285
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("The appeal of strict liability, it can be
noted, does not depend on any notion that the defendant is in a better position
than the plaintiff to allocate or distribute risk of harm .... "); William K. Jones,
Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise,92 COLUM. L. REV. 1705, 1778 (1992)
("[R]isk distribution and the dispersion of losses should be given little or no
weight in formulating tort policy."); cf. Kenneth S. Abraham, Twenty-FirstCentury Insurance and Loss Distribution in Tort Law, in EXPLORING TORT LAW
81, 83 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005) (explaining that loss distribution has long
been out of academic fashion but the major expansion in "incidence and scope of
liability... can be ascribed at least in part to loss-distribution[ ]").
Loss distribution arguments are often folded into arguments in favor of
enterprise liability, although enterprise liability is a broader term.
Conceptually, enterprise liability is built around two notions: first, that
enterprises are able to spread losses, and second, that because of their superior
knowledge and ability to control risks, enterprises should assume greater
responsibility for their products or services. Combined, the two standards are
thought to have been influential; the history is traced in George L. Priest, The
Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundation of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985). The
responsibility aspects of enterprise liability are central to this Article, which
argues that the appropriate responsibility of enterprises-and nonenterprises-can be fully developed under the negligence regime without the
need for strict liability. On occasion, enterprise liability is sometimes used as a
synonym for strict liability. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Should Enterprise
Liability Replace the Rule of Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous
Activities?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 611, 612-13 (1998) [hereinafter Geistfeld,
Enterprise Liability] (arguing that enterprise liability should be restricted to
abnormally dangerous activities).

250

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

activity's dangerousness. This notion can be seen most
prominently in the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts:
Liability for Physical Harm, where an activity is considered
abnormally dangerous if "[(1)] the activity creates a
foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm
even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors; [and
(2)] the activity is not one of common usage."11 I contest the
validity of that test and seek to substitute an activity-based
reasonableness test in its place. I do not deal directly with
products liability law-which, outside of manufacturing
defects, is now widely seen to be a species of fault
liability12-although much of my analysis is applicable to
products liability law as well. 13 And I address in a separate
article the death of strict liability 14when damage is
knowingly inflicted because of necessity.
A. Summary of My Analysis
I start with standard economic theory of strict liability,
but challenge several of its underlying assumptions. Under
the standard analysis, an injurer might be at fault because

11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20(b)(1)(2), at 278 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). The Restatement (Third) of Torts
has separate, related sections governing intrusion by livestock (§ 21), injury
from wild animals (§ 22), and abnormally dangerous animals (§ 23). On the
abnormally dangerous concept generally, see Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals
Oriented Approach to Strict Tort Liability for Abnormally DangerousActivities,
48 BAYLOR L. REV. 341 (1996).

12. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(m), at
33-34 (1998); David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict"
Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 744 (arguing that accidental
harm can be fully addressed under the negligence regime because that regime
fully embraces the variety of considerations that are relevant to an actor's
responsibility). I deal with "strict liability" for manufacturing defects briefly
below, see infra text accompanying notes 129-30, and I rely on products liability
cases to emphasize the flexibility of the reasonableness test, see infra text
accompanying notes 119-25.
13. I argue elsewhere that products liability law ought to be fully
assimilated into a negligence law applicable to sellers, without any intital
distinction between sales of products and services. Peter M. Gerhart, Why
Product Liability: An Inquiry Into Non-Justificatory Thought (on file with
author).
14. Peter M. Gerhart, Vincent as a Negligence Case: A Justificational
Analysis (Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper 07-18,
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=987515.
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the quality of care she takes fails to meet the standard of
reasonable care. She might, in other words, drive
unreasonably fast. Alternatively, an injurer may be at fault
because, although she undertakes an activity with
reasonable care, she does the activity with unreasonable
frequency, in an unreasonable location or time, or by an
unreasonable method. 15 This is an activity-based negligence
case. A driver might drive a truck containing a dangerous
explosive through a congested area when a less dangerous,
but effective, route is available-unreasonable location or
time-or the driver might be able to transport the
dangerous explosive by some means-say by rail-that is
less dangerous-unreasonable method. Or a manufacturer
of industrial wastes might dump the wastes in a particular
location often enough so that the build-up creates a
hazard-unreasonable frequency. The law has an interest
in apprehending each type of fault, for harm could be
avoided if the fault were avoided.
Recognizing that two kinds of faulty decisions can lead
to harm, strict liability is thought to be superior to
negligence liability in that it casts a wider net. Ordinary
negligence is thought to examine fault only in the sense of
quality-of-care decisions. But strict liability makes the actor
responsible for all harm-even the harm that occurs after
the actor has invested in a reasonable quality of care-and
it therefore also induces the actor to make reasonable
16
activity-based decisions in order to reduce costs.
Accordingly, putting aside administrative costs and issues
relating to the victim's ability to avoid the harm, it is

15. The distinction between quality-of-care decisions and activity-based
decisions was first recognized in Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (1980). It has now become a staple of the
economic analysis of tort law. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 61;
SHAVELL, supra note 5, at 193. As the text indicates, the term "activity-based
decisions" encompasses decisions about how frequently to undertake an activity
(frequency level decision), where to undertake an activity (location decisions),
how to undertake an activity (mode or method of activity decisions), and when
to undertake an activity (timing of activity decisions). See Stephen G. Gilles,
Rule Based Negligence and the Regulation of Activity Levels, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
319, 332-36 (1992).
16. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 64-66; SHAVELL, supra note
5, at 202-05. A recent restatement of this view is contained in David Rosenberg,
The Judicial Posner on Negligence Versus Strict Liability: Indiana Harbor Belt
Railroad Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 120 HARv. L. REV. 1210, 1217 (2006).
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thought that strict liability should be used whenever
activity-based decisions are an important determinant of
harm, and that the concept of abnormally dangerous
activity should be defined with respect to those activitybased decisions. 17 The theory of strict liability says that
sometimes it is important to address an actor's activitybased decisions, that the negligence standard cannot do
that, and that we therefore invoke the strict liability

17. Professor Hylton has translated the basic insights about quality-of-care
and activity-based decisions into a sophisticated theory for comparing the
external costs and benefits of an activity when the activity is done with
reasonable care. Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90
Nw. U. L. REV. 977 (1996) [hereinafter Hylton, Missing Markets]; Keith N.
Hylton, The Theory of Tort Doctrine and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 54
VAND. L. REV. 1413, 1420-23 (2001) [hereinafter Hylton, Theory & Restatement].
When the external costs and benefits of an activity are roughly equal, and the
activity is done with reasonable care, there is no warrant for legal intervention.
In that instance, any additional liability, beyond that for not being careful, will
eliminate benefits as well as harm in equal proportion and will therefore
produce no net benefits. Where, however, the external costs of the activity are
greater than the external benefits, imposing liability will reduce those costs-by
inducing the actor to engage in less activity-without sacrificing significant
benefits of the activity. This can be understood in roughly the following way:
when an actor uses dynamite to remove a tree that could be felled by a saw, the
benefit of using dynamite-less effort-is far less than the expected external
costs of using the dynamite and the activity can be called "abnormally
dangerous." Professor Hylton would therefore impose strict liability in order to
internalize the costs of using dynamite that are not incurred when using a saw.
Professor Hylton's analytical approach is theoretically sound but
impractical. Because we have no meter for measuring externalities, we are left
with the need to compare the costs and benefits of various ways of undertaking
tasks, and this can best be done by asking whether the defendant's choice of a
method, location, or time for the activity was reasonable. This is essentially the
inquiry that Professor Hylton's theory calls for. When a method of operation
imposes greater external costs than benefits as compared to other methods it is
an unreasonable method; accordingly, an inquiry into the reasonableness of the
activity is the inquiry that is needed to make Professor Hylton's theory
workable. Professor Hylton eschews this approach by repeating the
conventional wisdom that the reasonableness inquiry does not tell us when the
reduction in an actor's activity level is desirable. Hylton, Theory & Restatement,
supra, at 1419. In my view, however, we can apply the reasonableness inquiry
to relevant activity-based decisions. See infra text accompanying notes 90-130.
Therefore, my Article can be understood as an attempt to operationalize
Professor Hylton's theory, one that is driven by the conviction that it is better to
analyze directly whether the external costs and benefits of an activity exceed
those of alternative activity-based decisions-in which case the actor has chosen
an unreasonable activity-based method-rather than applying strict liability
just because we have the intuition that external costs might exceed external
benefits.
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standard, which does do it.18
Although I embrace the analytical distinction between
quality-of-care decisions and activity-based decisions, and
acknowledge that harm can sometimes be prevented by
making more reasonable activity-based decisions, I challenge
several assumptions that underlie the supposed appeal of
strict liability.
Economists seem to understand harm from risk as
coming from two sources: either from a lack of due care or
from activity-based decisions. They leave little room in their
analysis for harm that arises from non-preventable accidents
or from reasonable activity-based decisions. That is why
they are comfortable with the notion that strict liability will
prevent harm by internalizing the costs of activity-based
decisions. We can depict this understanding as follows:
Harm from Risk: Depiction One
Lack of Due Care

Residual
Activity
Decisions

In this depiction, there is risk left over after due care is
taken, and we can consider this to be the residual risk of
the negligence standard. But under this view residual risk
is made up entirely, or almost entirely, of risk from activitybased decisions. After we account for harm that comes from
activity-based decisions, there is no, or almost no, pure
residual risk-risk left over after the costs of unreasonable
18. Cf. GEISTFELD, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, at 25-26 ("Once strict
liability is justified as a method for enforcing the duty of care, there is no
fundamental inconsistency between strict liability and negligence liability.
Strict liability applies when evidentiary problems impair negligence liability,
and negligence liability governs all other cases."). An early version of this
argument was presented in Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test
for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L. J. 1055 (1972). Their proposal turned on
an argument formulating a duty to investigate by the actor who could most
easily get information that would avoid the harm, which they denominated as
the party "in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between
accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on the decision once it is
made." Id. at 1060. This describes the reasonable duty to investigate and this
duty is fully absorbed into the existing concept of the reasonable person. See
infra text accompanying notes 119-25.
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care or activity-based decisions have been internalized.
Because strict liability internalizes all of the harm from
risk it therefore fills the container of risk and gives
appropriate incentives to avoid accidents. And because
under strict liability we need not attribute the harm to
either due care or activity-based decisions, it does not really
matter whether or how we distinguish between them.
Although economists are rarely clear about the role of
residual risks, the assumption that strict liability eliminates
all risks permeates much of the economic theory of strict
liability. 19
I present a contrasting view. Diagrammatically, the view
can be understood in the context of the following depiction:
Harm from Risk: Depiction Two
Pure Residual

Lack of
Due Care

Unreasonable
Activity
Decisions

Reasonable
Activity

Reasonable
Due Care

Like Depiction One, this depiction accepts that harm
stems from both unreasonable due care decisions and
unreasonable activity-based decisions. Unlike Depiction One,
however, even after the costs of unreasonable due care and
unreasonable activity-based decisions have been internalized,
harm from activity still results. In this depiction, there is a
form of pure residual risk left over after the injurer takes
reasonable care-the risk of unavoidable accidents. No
matter how careful people are in either taking care or in
activity-based decisions, "accidents happen." These residual
risks are the ones that are beyond human control in the
sense that no decision that we can reasonably expect
humans to make would have changed the outcome. Just as
we know that lightning strikes even reasonably safe people,

19. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Ariel Porat, Liability Externalities and
Mandatory Choices: Should Doctors Pay Less?, 1 J. TORT L. 1, 4 (2006), available
("According to the standard
at http://www.bepress.com/jtlIvoll/issl/art2
economic analysis of law, a rule of strict liability with perfect compensation
causes injurers to internalize the risk that they impose on others. The
precaution and activity levels of injurers, consequently, are efficient.").
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we know that reasonable safety does not absolve us of risk
and therefore from harm.
Depiction Two invites us to focus on three questions
that explore the different views about strict liability.
First, the economic analysis of strict liability seems to
have ignored the possibility of pure residual risk that I
portray here, and therefore has not addressed the question
of whether we want to make pure residual risk an occasion
for imposing liability. This stands in sharp contrast with
the analysis when we focus on the level of care. Under
negligence, we recognize that when due care is taken there
is no warrant for imposing liability, which gives us the
residual category of reasonable harm. The intuition behind
the theory in this Article is that just as actors can make
reasonable care decisions, they can also make reasonable
activity-based decisions. They may perform their activity at
the least risky place or time, by a method that is least risky,
or with a frequency that is matched by their productivity.
When they do, I do not see why we would impose liability on
those decisions, and it will be detrimental to do so.
I argue that an actor should not be responsible for the
consequences of reasonable decisions-either due care or
activity-based decisions-and that strict liability should be
avoided because it violates that principle. If an accident is
unavoidable because the injurer has made reasonable
decisions about her quality of care and her relevant activity
base, that means that the injurer could not have reduced
the harm by any act that we expect humans to take. In my
view, it is inconsistent with the requirements of justice to
hold the injurer responsible for the harm under these
circumstances. 20 By pointing out the inappropriate overbreadth of strict liability, I argue that the strict liability
regime should be avoided unless there is no other way of
interdicting unreasonable activity-based decisions.
A second question I raise is whether some activitybased decisions ought to be per se reasonable. Standard
economic analysis assumes that society should care how
frequently an activity is undertaken. This assumption rests
on the notion that the normative force of tort law requires
the law to care about whether an activity is done with

20. See infra text accompanying notes 54-74.
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reasonable frequency. More particularly, it assumes, for
example, that we should care how often a person goes to the
grocery store. 21 I dispute this assertion. Liability should not
be imposed on many frequency level decisions because it is
often not unreasonable for a person to ignore the harm from
frequency decisions. We normally do not want to make the
frequency with which an activity is done the source of
responsibility because we do not expect or require people to
evaluate their frequency decisions from the standpoint of
risk. Doing so would unduly impinge on people's freedom of
activity. 22 As I argue below, it would be a strange legal
system indeed that assumed that when people decide how
often to drive to the grocery story they either would, or
should, take into account the fact that the risk of harm is
repeated with the frequency of the trips.
Finally, I challenge a third assumption underlying the
supposed superiority of strict liability, namely that common
law courts are not able to make judgments about the
reasonableness of an actor's activity-based decisions, and
that courts should resort to strict liability-notwithstanding
its over-breadth from the standpoint of fault-because they
have inadequate tools for determining when an actor has
made unreasonable activity-based decisions. 23 Thus, it is
said that information costs for such a determination would
the reasonableness of the decision
be too high, making
"unobservable."24 And it is said that courts are unable to

21. See Shavell, supra note 15, at 2.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 75-82.
23. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW
163 (2d ed. 2002) ("In theory, there could be liability for the 'negligent' decision
to ship always by truck, on the ground that it would be safer, all things
considered, for me to ship via some alternative method. But in practice this
never happens, because of the difficulty of demonstrating that it is negligent to
have engaged in a particular activity (such as shipping by truck) at all.");
Steven Shavell, Economics and Liability for Accidents, in NEW PALGRAVE

DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Steve N. Durlaf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed.
forthcoming 2008), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olincenter/papers/pdflshavell_535.pdf. Landes and Posner acknowledge that courts
can examine activity-based issues when low information costs are offset by the
advantages of examining activity-based decisions-as in nuisance cases and
rescue cases-but they generally believe that the information costs of
examining activity-based decisions are high. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at
70-71.
24. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, The Economics of Tort
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make judgments about whether the frequency of driving
was a cause-in-fact of the harm. 25 The theory of strict
liability is really a theory of the inadequacy of the
reasonableness standard.
I argue, as others have before me, 26 that the
reasonableness standard is infinitely flexible and adaptive.
For those activity-based decisions that are relevant to the
determination of responsibility, we should not underestimate
a court's capacity to assess the reasonableness of activitybased decisions. In cases where frequency decisions are
relevant to fault-such as when toxic chemicals are dumped
repeatedly in the same place 27-courts can recognize and
address the issues without undue expense or error. Other
relevant activity-based decisions require only a comparison
of two different ways of doing an activity-for example,
whether an activity should be done in one of two places, by
one of two methods, or at one of two times. Such
comparisons are functionally similar to the general qualityof-care inquiry, which asks whether a task should be done
one way or the other. This assessment is the kind courts
make all the time and is susceptible to the same kind of
burden shifting and presumptive devices that animate
ordinary negligence law.
Not only is strict liability an unnecessary, overly broad,
Law: A Prdcis, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (Jiirgen G.
Backhaus ed., 2d. ed. 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=458701
("Although courts may occasionally take into account the frequency of an
activity in their assessment of negligence, often no threshold of 'optimal
frequency' can be easily utilized by legal rules as a liability allocation
mechanism, given the difficulty of pinpointing a critical value to separate
efficient from excessive activity.").
25. See Gilles, supra note 15, at 333 (discussing the difficulty of proving that
activity-based decisions caused harm).
26. See, e.g., id. at 320; John J. Donohue, III, The Law and Economics of
Tort Law: The Profound Revolution, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1059 (1989)
("[Olne who blasts [dynamite] as carefully as humanly possible could still be
deemed negligent if the court found that the net social benefits could be
increased by using a wrecking ball rather than dynamite." (footnote omitted)).
27. See, e.g., State Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventura Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J.
1983) (applying strict liability for dumping mercury wastes into water over fifty
years). But see Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft Co., No. CIV-91-525-TUC-ROS, 1998
U.S. Dist. Lexis 17228, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 26, 1998) (assigning no strict
liability for abnormally dangerous substances because strict liability applies to
activities, not substances, and stating that where accumulation does not cause
harm there is no liability).
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and harmful doctrine, it is a mirage. The results in "strict
liability" cases could easily have been reached under the
activity-based reasonableness test that I propose hereeven those cases that we have thought of as quintessential
"strict liability" cases: Rylands v. Fletcher and the blasting
cases. 28 And the modern analytics of strict liability have not
been lost on courts. By and large courts are abandoning the
distinction between strict liability and negligence liability.
To be sure, plaintiffs still bring claims in strict liability,
courts still analyze and respond to those claims, and
judicial decisions are sometimes still couched in terms of
strict liability. Yet a close reading of the "strict liability"
cases shows that what many courts are doing is assessing
the defendant's activity-based decisions-those that relate
to the frequency, location, method, or timing of the
activity-and are applying the label "strict liability" when
29
they believe that those decisions were unreasonably made.
The result is a kind of doctrinal charade, with courts doing
the negligence analysis that determines whether to hold the
injurer responsible for the harm and then applying a strict
liability label, but without clearly showing the analysis that
led to the result. 30
B. An Illustration
A straightforward illustration demonstrates these points.
In Hammontree v. Jenner, the defendant, an epileptic, was
under a doctor's care. 31 He had been given a drivers' license
32
on the condition that he follow his prescribed treatment.
One day he drove into the plaintiffs bicycle shop, testifying
later that he had blacked out. 33 When the owner of the
28. Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.); see infra text
accompanying notes 131-48.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 156-68.
30. Much the same charade has occurred, of course, in products liability law.
The notion that a defendant is strictly liable for warning and design defects is
no different from the argument that a defendant is strictly liable for negligent
acts. The strict liability label is meaningless unless we can define defect (or
negligence) and once we define defect (or negligence), the term strict liability is
surplus.
31. Hammontree v. Jenner, 20 Cal. App. 3d 528, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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bicycle shop sued, the court applied the negligence rule,
refusing to say, as the plaintiff claimed, that the defendant
should be responsible for the harms caused by his defective
condition. 34 The court did not refer to the language of strict
liability, but it held in effect that the defendant's condition
was neither abnormally dangerous nor defective, even
though the risk of seizure could be controlled, but not
eliminated, with medical treatment. Because the plaintiff
could not prove that the defendant acted unreasonably in
light of his condition, the plaintiff recovered nothing.
This was an especially compelling case for the plaintiff,
presenting something of a challenge to the fault-based tort
system. The plaintiff contributed nothing to the accidentexcept to open a bicycle shop on that street-and the
defendant controlled any information that might have
shown that he did not take due care, making it hard for the
plaintiff to prove, for example, that he had not taken his
medicine or had ignored signs that might cause a reasonable
person to refrain from driving. Yet the negligence rule
protects a defendant and allows the loss to lie where it falls.
Why?
In effect, the negligence rule suggests that the law does
not want to inquire into whether it was reasonable for the
defendant to drive. The frequency of driving is not relevant
to the defendant's responsibility. This result is necessary to
preserve the autonomy and free movement of the disabled
and to avoid imposing extra costs on a disabled person who
35
has exercised all reasonable control over the disability.

34. Plaintiffs lawyer cleverly argued that if an auto manufacturer is
"strictly liable" for defective products, then a driver should be "strictly liable"
for his defective condition. The court found "some logic" in this syllogism, id. at
531, but declined to apply it because it would upset the negligence regime that
is generally applied to automobile driving, id. at 531-32.
35. Corrective justice theories would articulate the governing principle in
terms of preserving the capacity of the defendant to lead the kind of life he
chooses, given his ability to reasonably control his disability. See, e.g., John B.
Attanasio, Aggregate Autonomy, the Difference Principle, and the Calabresian
Approach to Products Liability, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW

299, 299-300 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness
and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 311, 342-43 (1996)
("[P]ersons have a deep and powerful interest in leading their lives in ways that
accord with their aims and aspirations ....
[This requires us to consider] the
burden that the untaken precaution imposes on the injurer's freedom of action .. "
(emphasis omitted)); Richard W. Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in
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Until we can determine that the driver failed to exercise
reasonable care over his disability or that the risk of getting
in the car was excessive in comparison to the importance of
the freedom to drive, the activity-based decision of the
defendant was not the source of legal liability.
Strict liability would distort this scheme. Under strict
liability, an epileptic who took reasonable precautions to
reduce the risk of a seizure while driving-and therefore
did all he reasonably could to avoid harm-would have to
fear that every time he got in the car he would have to pay
for the privilege of driving, even though drivers without
that condition would drive without that fear. The tradeoff
between the victim's harm and the defendant's freedom of
movement is a difficult one, but the social value the court
endorsed by choosing the negligence rule-to preserve the
the plaintiff can
defendant's freedom of movement unless
37
show negligence 36 -is a justifiable one.
Negligence Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 143, 164-65 (2002) (adopting the Kantian
notion that "[a]ll persons should be treated as ends in themselves (i.e., as free
and equal persons seeking to fully realize their humanity)"). Law and economics
scholars would emphasize that the defendant invested the appropriate amount
of society's resources in controlling the risk, that the law could not compel the
defendant to be more than reasonable, and that imposing liability without fault
would reduce the actor's incentive to engage in productive activity. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972).
36. One problematic aspect of this case was the difficulty of proving that the
defendant was negligent even if the defendant had been negligent. If the
defendant had been negligent it would have been because he failed to take his
medicine or engaged in behavior that a reasonable person with his disease
would have avoided, but the evidence about those matters was entirely in the
control of the defendant. The deficiency of the fault based regime is that it
might deny recovery when the defendant was at fault simply because the
plaintiff could not demonstrate the fault. This is the problem of false negatives.
This deficiency can be minimized. The law has proved flexible enough to adjust
to this deficiency through various procedural devices. Indeed, in Hammontree
itself, the court gave the jury a res ipsa loquitor instruction, which allowed the
jury to find for the plaintiff if the jury disbelieved the defendant's testimony
about the steps he had taken to control his disease. For a discussion of the use
of res ipsa loquitor and similar procedural devices to ease the plaintiff's burden
of proof in the context of activity-level negligence determinations, see infra text
accompanying notes 126-27.
37. Once we know that the defendant has acted reasonably, and once we
conclude that the plaintiff could not reasonably have reduced the harm by selfprotecting, the choice of where the loss should fall consists of a choice between
two innocent victims-one the victim of epilepsy and one the victim of the
accident. For the reasons given supra note 35, the law lets the loss lie where it
falls. Bad luck is owned by the victim.

2008]

THE DEATH OF STRICT LIABILITY

But if we change the hypothetical, we can see how an
activity-based reasonableness inquiry can impose sensible
limits on activity-based decisions. Assume that the
defendant with the epilepsy decided to become a taxi driver.
That would mean that he would be on the road more
frequently and that would increase the social risk from his
epilepsy by increasing the possibility that if he had a
seizure it would be while driving. At the same time, neither
the defendant nor society would bear a great cost if the law
put pressure on the defendant to take a less risky jobpresumably he would be fit for many other jobs and would
offer society no special benefits as a taxi driver. 38 Under
these circumstances, it would make sense to say that
although a court would not be concerned about the risks
that a reasonable epileptic driver imposes on society by
general driving, the court might be concerned if the
defendant chose to be a taxi driver-just as the defendant,
being reasonable, is likely to say that he should find
another, less dangerous profession. In this context, the
choice of becoming a taxi driver is not a reasonable one
because it increases the risk of harm from the disability
without substantially increasing the benefits to society or
the opportunities available to the driver (given our
assumption that many other jobs would be open to him).
True, we could use strict liability to rule against the
defendant in this hypothetical. We could say that taxi
driving under these circumstances is an uncommon or
abnormally dangerous activity. But this would be confusing
and unnecessary. Certainly taxi driving in general is
neither an abnormally dangerous nor an uncommon
38. Presumably, the defendant would be able to find other, less dangerous
employment. Although the defendant would have to accept less attractive
employment, and would suffer if similarly attractive jobs were not available, we
can well believe that foregoing the opportunity to drive a taxi is a small sacrifice
for the defendant to make to reduce the risk of harm to others. It does not
matter to the point made in the text that this reasonableness calculation might
be disputed. If the defendant were uniquely qualified to drive a taxi and for no
other profession, if society could not find someone who was as well qualified to
drive a taxi, and if the risks of driving a taxi were not as great as imagined in
this hypothetical, that might change the outcome of the analysis. However, the
general point in the text would not change-namely, that the choice to become a
taxi driver would shift the focus from whether the defendant took due care to
control his epilepsy to whether it was reasonable to become a taxi driver even if
due care reduces the risk of a seizure. The shift in focus is the shift from due
care to an activity-based standard.
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activity, and although taxi driving by an epileptic with this
condition is unreasonably dangerous-as described in the
last paragraph-the conclusion does not follow naturally
from the words "abnormally dangerous." Because
"abnormally dangerous" is thought to apply to blasting and
dangerous animals, the analogy to an epileptic taxi driver
would be obscure. The words "abnormally dangerous"
simply do not indicate the range of relevant considerations
for determining the responsibility of an epileptic driver. 39
The conclusion that driving a taxi is abnormally dangerous
is really the conclusion that choosing to be a taxi driver
under these circumstances is an unreasonable choiceunder the analysis of the last paragraph. The better
approach is to apply an activity-based negligence testdetermining whether the decision to be a taxi driver is
unreasonably dangerous given the options-because only
that test points to the analysis that should be done to
determine whether the epileptic's choice of profession was
faulty.
C. Outline of This Article
My assault on the "rule" of strict liability can be
captured in five propositions, which are presented in
Section I of this Article: (A) we have no normative,
workable test for determining when strict liability should
be applied; (B) liability should not be imposed when the
defendant has made reasonable activity-based and due care
decisions; (C) for normative reasons, liability should not be
imposed on many frequency decisions; (D) courts have the
capacity to assess the reasonableness of relevant activitybased decisions; and (E) the outcome of strict liability cases
can best be understood as applications of the fault-based
theory that I outline.

39. The analysis might be done under the "uncommon activity" branch of
the strict liability test. Indeed, it would not be surprising if taxi companies did
in fact screen their drivers for conditions like epilepsy that increase the risk of
harm as the activity increases in frequency. And insurance companies might
make epileptic drivers, or their employers, pay more for insurance. But thinking
about this activity in terms of the "commonness" of the activity is also
problematic. The notion of uncommon activity is not self-defining nor is its
content known. The words themselves do not lead the analyst to look at the
kinds of considerations that are relevant to determining whether it is
unreasonable for an epileptic to choose one profession over another.
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But the story of strict liability contains a broader
lesson. If I am correct that strict liability cases could have
had the same outcome under an activity-based
reasonableness test, we must consider why courts did not
adopt such a test. Given the alternative I offer, why did the
doctrine of strict liability originate and survive? My theory
is that courts were not capable of understanding the
analytical basis of their decisions, that they intuitively
understood that sometimes the injurer should be held
responsible even though the injurer exercised due care, and
that they devised the theory of strict liability to embody
their intuition even though they could not explain it. This
suggests that legal reasoning sometimes proceeds from
intuition to analytics, from outcomes to reasons, rather
than the other way around. I discuss the implications of
this idea for a theory of legal reasoning in Part II.
I.

THE FIVE PROPOSITIONS

A. PropositionOne: We Have No Normative, Workable Test
for Determining When Strict Liability Should Apply
Strict liability doctrine is defective because the line
between negligence
and strict liability is defectively
40
ephemeral.
40. Mark Geistfeld has argued that courts can interpret the factors in
section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to provide a coherent basis for
determining when to apply strict liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
520 (1965); Geistfeld, Enterprise Liability, supra note 10, at 652-59. Geistfeld's
analysis, however, does not provide a justification for strict liability. We can
interpret his analysis to also show that the factors in section 520 can help a
court determine when an activity-based decision is unreasonable, as he himself
recognizes. Geistfeld, Enterprise Liability, supra note 10, at 657 ("Of course,
these factors are also relevant to a negligence determination, but the deterrence
rationale for strict liability proceeds from the premise that a negligence inquiry
cannot always adequately evaluate every factor relevant to deterrence.").
Because I reject the premise that the "negligence inquiry cannot always
adequately evaluate" relevant factors, see infra text accompanying notes 90-130,
I reject the need for strict liability as a separate doctrine.
There is an irony in the intellectual history of strict liability. Section 520 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts made it clear that courts determine whether
an activity is abnormally dangerous by going through the kind of activity-based
reasonableness analysis that I espouse here. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
520 (1965). Commentators who favor wider responsibility recognized this and
rejected the Restatement. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 10, at 1712 ("[T]he general
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The realm of strict liability is thought to apply to
abnormally dangerous activities, which are thought to be
activities that present significant residual risk-that is,
risk not eliminated when an actor takes reasonable care.
Accidents resulting from residual risk are said to be
"unavoidable," in the sense that human agency cannot
practicably avoid the accidents. One problem with this
understanding is that we need a theory that would explain
why we would allocate residual risk to one person rather
than another. After all, residual risk is risk that cannot be
eliminated by human ingenuity-it is the risk of bad luckso it is not clear why the risk should fall on the injurer
rather than the victim. I address the issue of how we
allocate harm from residual risk in the next section. In this
section, I address the concept of residual risk itself.
The concept of residual risk would not be problematic if
it were understood to relate to risk that cannot be
eliminated by due care but that can be eliminated by
changing an actor's unreasonable activity decisions. If that
is what is meant by residual risk, then the concept of strict
liability would point to the need to address activity-based
decisions as well as due care decisions. But that would not
justify strict liability if, as I argue below, 41 activity-based
decisions can be addressed adequately under the negligence
regime. Then, negligence would eliminate both types of risk
and the only relevance of strict liability would be to address
the pure residual risk that can be eliminated by changing
neither due care nor activity-based decisions (which I claim
is an illegitimate basis for imposing responsibility on an

approach of the Restatement is flawed and should be revised."); Virginia E.
Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity Strict
Liability, 65 N.C. L. REV. 257, 272-73 (1987). Supporters of traditional views of
"abnormally dangerous" strict liability did not understand this. See, e.g., W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 555 (5th ed. 1984)
(arguing that section 520 of "the First Restatement set forth the best way of
articulating and describing the requirements that ought to be met for applying
strict liability to dangerous activities"). Once one rejects the loss spreading
rationale, section 520 can be seen to have eroded the notion of strict liability by
making it clear that putting a case in the strict liability category depends on
whether the defendant acted unreasonably. Others have recognized the
reasonableness pedigree behind section 520. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The
Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REV. 963, 970
(1981).

41. See infra text accompanying notes 90-130.
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actor 42).

But residual risk is generally thought of in a different,
problematic way-as a form of risk left over after due care
is taken, and significant residual risk, the concern of strict
liability, is thought to be residual risk that is greater than
normal-and hence risk that is abnormally dangerous. It is
as if some activities have normal residual risk after
reasonable care is taken and other activities have abnormal
residual risk after reasonable care is taken, and that only
the latter risk is worth addressing. This common conception
is problematic. We have no test for identifying the amount
of residual risk and no theory as to why some amounts of
residual risk ought to be the source43 of liability while lesser
amounts of residual risk ought not.
The problem of identifying the amount of residual risk
is apparent from the negligence standard. The negligence
standard revolves around eliminating unreasonable risk
given the activity's danger. The standard is geared toward
determining when the defendant should have reduced the
risk, but the negligence standard says nothing meaningful
about the residual risk that is left over once the
unreasonable risk is eliminated-except that, under the
negligence standard, the victim should bear it. A court that
finds that the defendant acted reasonably says nothing
about the degree of risk that remains. Our negligence
standard tests tell us when an actor leaves unreasonable
risks but we have no independent concept or test for

42. See infra text accompanying notes 54-60.
43. It is possible to argue that residual risk is related to the technology of
precautions, that when an activity is new the technology of precautions is likely
to be underdeveloped, and that we can identify large amounts of residual risk
by identifying the underdeveloped nature of the precautions provided by
existing technology. Under this view, strict liability would hasten investment in
the technology of new precautions and reduce residual risk to acceptable levels.
Although this view of residual risk has some coherence, it is not clear by what
test we would determine whether the technology of precautions is
underdeveloped, for this implies knowledge about what is possible in the future.
Moreover, if an actor is not actively investing in the technology of better
precautions, or implementing them when they are known, it is likely that the
actor would be acting unreasonably. See infra text accompanying notes 119-26.
Finally, the notion that residual risk can be identified by evaluating the
technology of precautions implies that strict liability would apply at early
stages of new activities but not at later stages, which is not how strict liability
is now understood.
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determining the amount of residual or reasonable risk.
It is often thought that we can use the dangerousness of
an activity as a proxy for determining the amount of
residual risk, but this is wrong. In fact, the negligence
standard automatically adjusts as the riskiness of the
activity increases. The more risky an activity, the greater
the precautions that must be taken and thus the less
residual risk. Accordingly, as the dangerousness of the
activity increases the space for strict liability decreases, 44
which makes it impossible to associate strict liability with
dangerousness alone. 45
Conversely, it is sometimes mistakenly believed that a
non-dangerous activity is likely to have little residual
risk, 46 but, as a matter of logic, that is not true. Depending
on the type of precautions that are possible, it is conceivable
on logical terms that an activity could have a relatively
small risk of harm before reasonable precautions are taken
but a high residual risk after precautions are taken. Think
of a water main. There may be few precautions that can
help us predict where the water main might break, and
most water main breaks might cause relatively little
damage. Yet, the damage from some water main breaks

44. See, e.g., Ergon, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 966 F. Supp. 577, 583 (W.D. Tenn.
1977) (finding that the storage of gasoline requires a high degree of care); Miller
v. Civil Constructors, Inc., 651 N.E.2d 239, 245 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (finding that
the use of firearms requires a high degree of care); Resteiner v. Sturm Ruger &
Co., 566 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (addressing a claim that the
storage of firearms requires a heightened degree of care); Matulevich v.
Matulevich, 498 A.2d 939, 941 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (requiring a higher degree
of care in the handling of firearms); Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 470
P.2d 393, 395 (Utah 1970) (applying a strict liability standard to high tension
electrical transmission wires); Foster v. City of Keyser, 501 S.E.2d 165, 168 (W.
Va. 1970) (finding that the transmission of natural gas requires high degree of
care).
45. See, e.g., Ind. Inner Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d
1174, 1181 (7th Cir. 1990) (refusing to apply strict liability based on the
dangerousness of a chemical alone).
46. The Restatement (Third) of Torts for example, says that: "The absence of
a highly significant risk is one of several reasons that courts have been
unwilling to impose strict liability for harms caused by leaks or ruptures in
water mains: the likelihood of harm-causing incidents is not especially high,
and the level of harm when there is such an incident is generally not severe."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYsIcAL HARM § 20(g), at 287
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). This seems to equate a low level of average
dangerousness with a low level of residual harm after due care is taken.
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could he high, depending on where they occur. Little
average danger implies that fewer precautions have to be
taken and that might imply that the residual risk after
those precautions are taken is more than
trivial. It all
47
depends on the technology of precautions.
In other words, there is no a priori reason to think that
the amount of residual risk is related to the danger presented
by the activity. The dangerousness of the activity when
reasonable precautions are not taken is a poor proxy for the
residual risk after reasonable precautions are taken. And
there is no other known test for determining which
activities are associated with high residual risk and which
48
are not.
Aside from having no test for determining when
residual risk is high, we have no convincing theory for why
high residual risk should be shifted from the victim to the
injurer while low residual risk should not be. Of course,
high residual risk is, by definition, more dangerous than
low residual risk, but if the law should be troubled by high
residual risk, why would the law not also be troubled by low
residual risk? No theory of strict liability addresses the
question of why high residual risk should be the occasion

47. In other words, when a water main breaks, it could be that the cost of
precautions is very high; after all, it is difficult to predict where and why a
water main will rupture. That implies that there may be few precautions that
can realistically be taken to prevent water main breaks, which indicates that
the residual risk would be high. Under the "residual risk" version of strict
liability, this would be a good case for strict liability, but strict liability is not
applied in these cases (apparently because the average danger is not great). See,
e.g., John T. Arnold Assocs. v. City of Wichita, 615 P.2d 814 (Kan. Ct. App.
1980); Reter v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 482 P.2d 170 (Or. 1971) (applying the
same standard to an irrigation ditch).
48. Some theorists appear to believe that residual risk can be identified by
determining the risk that is addressed by modifying activity-based decisions.
See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 1215-16. Under this view, risk is created
by either the lack of due care or by inappropriate activity-based decisions, and
does not otherwise exist. To the contrary, as I argue below, we can understand
the risk of human activity to derive from three sources: lack of due care,
inappropriate activity-based decisions, and bad luck. We have no a priori test
for distinguishing between the three sources of risk and therefore no a priori
basis for determining which residual risk should subject one to liability. One
aspect of the strict liability debate is whether the risk from bad luck should fall
on the injurer or the victim, and we do not even address that issue unless we
have a way of distinguishing the residual risk-after due care is taken-from
activity-based decisions and the residual risk from bad luck.
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for shifting losses while low residual risk should not be. We
have no theory that posits responsibility on the basis of
harms 49 and thus none that posits responsibility on the
nature of residual harms.
In this respect, strict liability cannot be justified as an
extension of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. Rather than
being complimentary concepts, as is sometimes assumed,
strict liability and res ipsa are competing concepts-the
domains of the two concepts are different. Res ipsa is
relevant where the residual risk is small-that is, where
due care eliminates most of the risk. Otherwise, it would be
impossible to say that the accident is "of a kind which
50
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence."
But strict liability is thought to apply when there is a large
residual risk, and that implies that the harm could have
occurred even after due care has been taken. So res ipsa
applies precisely in those cases in which strict liability is
not relevant under the concept of abnormally high residual
risks.
The absence of a basis for distinguishing between
degrees of residual harm could support a case for the
universal application of strict liability. Some have argued,
logically, that if strict liability is good when residual harm

49. The Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted the notion that recovery in
private nuisance could be justified if "severe" harm is "greater than the other
should be required to bear without compensation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 829A cmt. a (1965) (stating that "[t]he rule stated in this Section
applies to conduct that results in a private nuisance, as defined in § 821D").
This appears to be a theory of harms, but, as the Restatement (Third) of Torts
says: this standard has "not been helpfully clarified by any large number of
subsequent judicial opinions." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR
PHYSICAL HARM § 20(c), at 282 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). The law could
make responsibility depend on the substantiality of the harm that occurs,
rather than on the unreasonableness of the harm, but if it did it would have to
rework the negligence standard itself. Likewise, it is sometimes assumed that
Judge Reid's concurring opinion in Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850, 864-68
(H.L.) (U.K.), endorses a test that makes responsibility flow for imposing
substantial expected harms, without regard to the cost of precautions for
avoiding those harms. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 6, at 149. Properly
understood, however, Bolton v. Stone dealt with the substantiality of the harm
at that location, and thus implicated only the reasonableness of location
decisions. See infra text accompanying note 111.
50. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 371 (2000). This is the traditional
restatement formulation from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D
(1965).
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reaches significant levels then it ought to be good as well for
lower levels of residual harm, which leads them to advocate
strict liability as the general rule for business activities
that lead to harm. 51 But that approach assumes that
responsibility is somehow related to the residual harm of
activities, and it ignores the costs of imposing liability
without fault when residual harm cannot be eliminated. As
I argue in the next section, residual risk is the very risk
over which human agency has no control (once we eliminate
risk that can be controlled by reasonable due care and
activity-based decisions). If we are to give human agency a
central role in our theory of torts-as I think we mustthen we would want to think carefully about how we
allocate the losses from risk that is beyond human agency.
In the absence of a convincing test for determining
when residual harm is significant and a convincing theory
to explain why defendants should be responsible only when
residual harm crosses some threshold, the line between
strict liability and negligence liability is uncertain and
unstable, which deprives strict liability of any predictive or
justificatory power. Not surprisingly, the cases are widely
divergent in determining when strict liability applies. The
attempt to identify some activities that are, by consensus,
abnormally dangerous and then to reason by analogy,
flounders with lack of consensus about what activities are
abnormally dangerous and any basis for making an
appropriate analogy. The blasting cases are thought of as
"paradigm case[s],"52 but there is no consistent pattern in
their outcomes: sometimes strict liability is applied,
sometimes it is not. 53 And reasoning by analogy is fruitless
if one cannot identify the basis on which analogies are to be
51. See, e.g., Hylton, Theory & Restatement, supra note 17, at 1417
("Economic theory seems as a general matter to suggest that we should see
strict liability as the general rule with negligence appearing as the exception in
certain instances."); Jones, supra note 10 (stating carefully, however, and
relaxing the strict liability rule when the plaintiff considerably contributes to
the harm or when the strict liability rule would unduly increase transaction
costs); Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 1217 ("[I]n short, courts do not need to
choose between rule regimes because strict liability works in all cases: it will be
effective when it is needed and do no harm when it is not.").
52. Correa v. Curbey, 605 P.2d. 458, 459-60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979);
Stockbridge Cmty. Ass'n v. Star Enter., Law No. 108514, 1992 WL 884453, at
*2 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1992).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 131-68.
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drawn, which is not possible if the concept of residual risk is
not first defined.
B. Proposition Two: Liability Should Not be Imposed When
The Defendant Has Made ReasonableActivity-Based and
Care Decisions
Given the role of activity-based
decisions in
contributing to harm from accidents, it would be logical to
argue that strict liability ought to be the general
background rule, because only strict liability influences
both due care and activity-based decisions, while negligence
liability is believed not to. 54 Why not adopt a regime-strict
liability-that influences both levels of care and activitybased decisions rather than a regime that influences only
levels of care-negligence-and is sometimes supplemented
55
by strict liability to regulate activity-based decisions?
Under this view, if activity-based decisions were broadly
implicated in accident cases-just as quality-of-care
decisions are-then it would make sense to adopt the
regime that influenced both quality-of-care decisions and
activity-based decisions.
This position raises two problems. In this section I focus
on the first problem: strict liability imposes liability on
those who have made reasonable activity-based, and due
care, decisions and is thus overly broad. In the next section,
I focus on the second problem: that we often do not want to
make judgments about an actor's responsibility for deciding
how frequently to undertake an activity.
The problem addressed in this section is that even if
strict liability could be justified because it imposes liability

54. See Jones, supra note 10.
55. These considerations are not the only ones that affect the choice between
negligence and strict liability, of course. Strict liability has the advantage of
making up for defects in the negligence regime because it imposes liability
when the defendant has failed to exercise due care but the plaintiff does not
have access to the information necessary to demonstrate that fact. GEISTFELD,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, at 25 (justifying strict liability on the basis
of "evidentiary problems" in the negligence regime); Geistfeld, Enterprise
Liability, supra note 10, at 633-36. It would be a mistake, however, to put too
much emphasis on the possibility of false negatives under the negligence
regime. As I argue below, the reasonableness standard is fully flexible enough
to minimize false negatives. See infra text accompanying notes 127-30.
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on those who make unreasonable activity-based decisions, it
has the defect of over-breadth: it also imposes liability on
those actors who make
reasonable activity-based
decisions-that is, those not at fault. As I now discuss, we
have no convincing theory that explains why it is just to
require one who is not at fault to compensate another for
harm caused, which is what strict liability does, and
plenty
of reasons to avoid imposing liability without fault.56
The analysis in this section is framed by a simple point.
The appeal of the reasonableness standard, when we use it,
is that it embodies a theory of non-responsibility that is
consistent with both the corrective justice and the economic
approach to torts. Applying strict liability to a defendant
who has made reasonable quality-of-care and reasonable
activity-based decisions takes tort law in a different, nofault direction. But if we endorse a moral and economic
theory of limited responsibility in general accident cases,
why would we jettison that theory in those cases that we
put in the "strict liability" category? After all, the negligence
regime, which encompasses a theory of responsibility for
fault, necessarily also encompasses a theory of nonresponsibility-namely, the theory that an actor should not
be responsible for the harms the actor causes when the
actor has no practicable control over those harms. This
notion of the limits of human responsibility also undermines
the strict liability regime unless we have a convincing
justification for allocating risks, through private law, that
are beyond human control.
Fault-based theories, whether from the corrective
justice or economic viewpoint, emphasize that legal and
moral responsibility in a person or organization must be
centered on the decisionmaking autonomy exercised by the
person or organization. This focus on decisionmaking
autonomy as the source of moral and legal responsibility
defines both when responsibility should be found and when
it should be withheld.
Core to this understanding is the notion that imposing
liability when an actor has had no opportunity to make a
different decision is itself unjust. From the corrective justice
standpoint, imposing liability in this circumstance would
56. The thought is an old one. See, e.g., Ezra Ripley Thayer, Liability
Without Fault, 29 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1916).
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deny the agency of the defendant. Here the modern
corrective justice scholars join Oliver Wendell Holmes.
Holmes noted that "the requirement of an act is the
requirement that the defendant should have made a choice.
But the only possible purpose of introducing this moral
element is to make the power of avoiding the evil
complained of a condition of liability."57 Weinrib echoes this
in Kantian terms: "The injurer can be liable only for action
that flows from the capacity for purposiveness. Such action
characterizes the injurer's status as an agent, and
differentiates the injurer from an irresponsible force of
nature ....An agent, therefore, ought not to be held liable
for being active."58 Similarly, Jules Coleman has
convincingly shown that any link-other than choicebetween act and harm is an insufficient basis,
by itself, for
imposing liability under corrective justice. 59
Similarly, a central insight of the economic approach to
torts-fully consistent with the corrective justice insight
just described-is that it is impossible to force people to
make more than reasonable decisions. The law can make
people pay for harms, but it cannot make them change the
way they exercise their freedom of choice in order to be
more than reasonable. The rule of strict liability
internalizes the cost of harm and imposes a price on
activity, but it does not induce anyone to exercise more care
than is reasonable in the circumstances. It is always
cheaper to pay the judgment rather than to change the
reasonable decisions that have been made-because once a

57. 0. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 95 (1881).

58. WEINRIB, supra note 6, at 181-83; see also ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF
THE COMMON LAW 190 (1995); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND
LUCK 50-51 (1999). For an argument that human agency supports the
imposition of strict liability, see John Gardner, Obligationsand Outcomes in the
Law of Torts, in RELATING TO RESPONSIBILITY 111, 113 (Peter Cane & John

Gardner eds., 2001). Ultimately, an appeal to human agency to determine
whether strict liability should be preferred to negligence liability begs the
question of which aspects of human agency ought to be the source of
responsibility. After all, the decision to go for a drive is an act of human agency,
as is the decision to drive recklessly and there is no a priori reason to believe
that one act of human agency ought to be the source of responsibility and the
other not. My proposal-to focus on the aspect of human agency that is
unreasonable in order to assign responsibility-honors the concept of human
agency, but avoids the question-begging.
59. COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 342-45.
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reasonable decision is made the expected harm is less than
the cost of more precautions. To penalize the reasonable act
runs the risk of losing the benefits of action without
reducing the costs of the action. 60
These two schools of thought point in the same
direction. It is morally unwise to impose liability when a
person has made a reasonable choice and impossible
practically to alter the standard of care by imposing
liability. 61 Fault is the only relevant moral and practical
measure of individual and organizational responsibility.
This not only explains why the fault-based negligence
rule predominates in accident law; it also suggests that the
imposition of liability when an actor has made reasonable
quality-of-care and activity-based decisions is inconsistent
with theories of responsibility. Just as there are positive
reasons for not imposing liability on a person who has acted
reasonably in terms of their quality of care, there are
positive reasons for not imposing liability on a person who
has made reasonable decisions about the frequency,
location, method, or timing of activity. Imposing liability in
these circumstances has no positive impact on human
behavior; it can only induce people to refuse to take risks
that benefit society; and it makes a person responsible for
conditions over which the person has no control. A rule of
strict liability imposes costs on those who have acted
reasonably-as to quality-of-care
and activity-based
decisions-and it has a negative impact on the values that
62
freedom from liability protects.
60. Oliver Wendell Holmes expressed this thought as well: "[T]he public
generally profits by individual activity. As action cannot be avoided, and tends
to the public good, there is obviously no policy in throwing the hazard of what is
at once desirable and inevitable upon the actor." HOLMES, supranote 57, at 95.
61. In terms that are sometimes used, imposing liability on a person who
has made reasonable due care and activity-based decisions is like a tax. See,
e.g., Hylton, Theory & Restatement, supra note 17, at 1417 (arguing that
liability for unreasonable decisions is not a tax, impliedly accepting the notion
that liability on any other basis is a tax). The relevance of this is that a liability
rule that functions as a tax would require a different kind of justification than a
liability rule that is imposed because of fault.
62. In this connection, it is surprising to see scholars who view tort law in
deterrence terms proclaim that strict liability "will be effective when it is
needed and do no harm when it is not." Rosenberg, supranote 16, at 1217. Once
an actor has made reasonable due care and activity-based decisions, imposing
liability-which, after all, punishes bad luck-will undoubtedly chill productive
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Indeed, once we put loss distribution theories aside, we
have no general theory of torts that supports liability
without fault. 63 Those following law and economics endorse
strict liability only because they believe-mistakenly-that
the negligence standard is inadequate to induce appropriate
activity-based decisions. Corrective justice scholars favor
strict liability only because of perceived evidentiary
problems in the fault-based regime, or as an extension of
rules of inference that make it easy to prove fault. They
provide 64no normative theoretical support for no-fault
liability.
Even theories that purport to be no-fault theoriesthose that focus on an activity rather than on the way the
activity is undertaken-turn out, on analysis, to revolve
around an inquiry into the injurer's fault. Richard Epstein's
proposal that causation can serve as a moral basis for
holding one responsible for harms 65 does not, in fact,
investment. Liability in those circumstances essentially says that one will be
punished for taking chances, even after one has done all that is possible to
minimize risk. That is a tax on risk-taking, not on faulty conduct, and one who
must pay a tax for his bad luck is likely to avoid exposing himself to the risk of
bad luck. Productive activity only occurs when the returns from good luck are
likely to outweigh the losses from bad luck, and enhancing the losses from bad
luck can only reduce productive activity. For a model that emphasizes the
inefficiency of imposing liability on risk averse actors who have taken all
reasonable care, see Marilyn J. Simon, Diagnoses and Medical Malpractice:A
Comparison of Negligence and Strict Liability Systems, 13 BELL J. ECON. 170
(1982).
63. We must distinguish descriptive from normative theories; a description
of strict liability that does not, in fact, justify it is not a theory of strict liability.
See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Property Right and Tortious Wrong in Vincent v.
Lake Erie, ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Oct. 2005, at 1, 4, available at
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss7/art6 (arguing that in some cases those who
benefit from the activity must also absorb the costs of the activity-which is
based on the justice of proportionality-but failing to provide a test for when
the benefits theory applies and when it does not).
64. In other words, the risks of any human endeavor can be broken down
into three constituents: those risks that can be addressed with due care, those
risks that can be addressed by making reasonable activity-based decisions, and
those risks-residual-that cannot be reduced by human ingenuity and
investment. Any theory of strict liability that purports to go beyond a theory of
the inadequacy of the negligence regime, which applies to all human decisions,
must provide a theory for allocating the residual risk to the injurer rather than
the victim. This Article has given the argument against such a theory.
65. Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict
Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974) [hereinafter Epstein, Defenses &
Subsequent Pleas]; Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL
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abandon fault except in several cases that Epstein believes
were wrongly decided. 66 Instead, Epstein offers a
rearrangement of the traditional elements of negligence
that would embed fault concepts in the causation element,
built around the following general paradigm: "If A caused
B's harm, then A should be responsible for B's harm." His
careful analysis of the contents of various forms of this
causal statement relies on considerations that are drawn
from a fault-based analysis. Thus, he says, A cannot "cause"
harm if A acted non-volitionally, which implies an inquiry
into whether A made a choice, 67 which is the focus of faultbased theory. And his scheme relies upon several gambits
that imply an inquiry into A's fault: even if A caused harm,
A is allowed to provide an excuse for doing SO,68 and A is
responsible for dangerous conditions but not for "mere"
conditions that cause harm. 69 His theory-really a theory of
causation, not strict liability-is an ingenious way of
getting around problems of proximate cause and gaps in the
theory of negligence, but it does not move tort law away
STUD. 151, 152 (1973) [hereinafter, Epstein, Strict Liability]. In recent years,
Epstein seems to be moving away from his own theory, although only in a way
that makes the theory's relationship to fault based analysis even clearer.
Richard A. Epstein, The Tort/Crime Distinction:A GenerationLater, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 1-2 (1996); Richard A. Epstein, Causation-InContext: An Afterword, 63
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 653 (1987).
66. Epstein clearly would reverse the outcome in two cases that allow a
defendant to use reasonable force to protect himself or his property, preferring
to distribute the loss from the victim to the self-serving defendant. Morris v.
Platt, 32 Conn. 75 (1864) (explaining that when defendant reasonably protects
himself from an attack by third-persons, the bystander he shot in the process
may not recover); Courvoisier v. Raymond, 47 P. 284 (Colo. 1896) (explaining
that it was error to instruct jury that, unless defendant shot plaintiff during an
assault on defendant, verdict should be for plaintiff). To Epstein these cases
appear to be inconsistent with Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 109
Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910), which held that one who reasonably uses
another's resources is privileged to do so but must pay for the resource. The
other decision that he intimates might be better addressed under causal terms,
Bolton v. Stone, can be fully addressed in the negligence regime. See infra note
111 and accompanying text.
67. Epstein, Strict Liability, supra note 65, at 166.
68. Id. at 168.
69. Id. at 179. Under this reading, leaving a knife in a kitchen drawer would
be a "mere" condition, while leaving a knife in a kitchen drawer knowing that a
house guest was likely to use it to inflict harm would be a "dangerous
condition." This builds an analysis of fault into the distinction between a "mere"
condition and "dangerous conditions." Id.
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from an inquiry into whether the injurer's conduct was
blameworthy.
George Fletcher's theory of reciprocal risk 70 or
dominance 71 appears to base liability on whether the
injurer imposes non-reciprocal risks on the victim. Yet in
determining whether a risk is non-reciprocal we have no
choice but to examine the context in which the defendant
made decisions, so that building a reservoir is nonreciprocal when done in coal country but not when done in
locations where there are plenty of reservoirs. 72 This too
implies that something about the choice of location is
faulty. 73 Moreover, the theory itself does not help us
distinguish reasonable risks-that, by definition are
reciprocal-from unreasonable-non-reciprocal-risks, and
we can support the distinction only by supplying some basis
for comparing the risks and benefits
of the decisions that
74
were made-a fault based inquiry.
The absence of a convincing theory of responsibility
without fault emphasizes the injustice of imposing liability
without fault. The subject of the law is human behavior and
when we cannot trace harm to human behavior, any
imposition of liability would make humans responsible for
the residual risk that amounts to forces of nature. While
there may be good reasons to relieve the victim of the
burdens of harm from such forces, there is no warrant to
make another responsible for those forces simply because
70. Fletcher, Fairness& Utility, supra note 1, at 537.
71. Fletcher, CorrectiveJustice, supranote 1.
72. Fletcher, Fairness& Utility, supra note 1, at 546.
73. Fletcher is imagining that building a reservoir in coal country imposes a
non-reciprocal risk, while building it in textile country (where there are many
mills, dams, and reservoirs) makes the risk reciprocal. Yet, a reservoir over a
coal mine in textile country would still be a non-reciprocal risk as to the coal
mine, under Fletcher's definition, so the existence of other reservoirs in that
area would not reduce responsibility to the coal mine under the non-reciprocity
theory. The distinction between locating your reservoir in coal country rather
than textile country is real, but it has to do with the decision about the location
of activity. See infra text accompanying notes 131-38. In Fletcher's terminology,
locating the reservoir in coal country imposed a non-reciprocal risk because it
was an unreasonable location for that activity, while locating the reservoir in
textile country was not. Fletcher, Fairness& Utility, supra note 1, at 546. This,
of course, is a fault-based concept.
74. Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence
Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 313-21 (1996).
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the other set them in motion-unless setting them in
motion is itself faulty. Strict liability that is applied to
reasonable choices, therefore, does an injustice.
C. For Normative Reasons, Liability Should Not be Imposed
on Many Frequency Decisions
Although the strict liability standard is overly broad,
perhaps this over-breadth is relatively small. Perhaps
unreasonable activity-based decisions are implicated in
most accidents, so that the injustice from the over-breadth
is tolerable. We cannot fully assess my argument about
strict liability's over-breadth until we have assessed the
relationship between frequency level decisions and
responsibility for accidents.
Advocates of strict liability believe that decisions about
the frequency of activity are implicated whenever accidents
occur. It is commonly thought, for example, that if we take
the relationship between the frequency of activities and
accidents seriously we should examine, when a person has
an accident, how often a person goes to the store, even if
they drive carefully on every trip to the store. If the decision
about how often to go to the store is relevant to tort law,
then strict liability has an advantage over negligence
liability-namely, the information needed to assess the
utility of a trip to the store is difficult to acquire and
evaluate in a negligence regime, while under the strict
liability standard courts need not make that assessment.
The actor who is faced with strict liability will
automatically forego trips to the store where the benefits of
the trip are outweighed by the possibility of having an
accident while driving with due care.
But it is a mistake to believe that frequency level
decisions are of general concern in accident cases. In fact, as
I argue in this section, frequency level decisions are often
not implicated in accident cases because we do not want to
make judgments concerning the actor's decision about how
frequently to undertake an activity. We do not want, in
other words, to make judgments about how often a person
goes to the store when determining his responsibility.
Frequency level decisions are simply not generally relevant
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to the calculus of fault. 75 Accordingly, we cannot justify the
over-breadth of strict liability as a way of inducing more
reasonable frequency level decisions; to the contrary the
fact that most frequency level decisions are irrelevant to
tort law suggests that the over-breadth of strict liability is
significant. It is precisely because we do not want people to
have to assess the value of their trips to the store that we
apply negligence, not strict liability, to automobile driving.
Those who assume that frequency level decisions are
relevant to accident law have confused the empirical with
the normative. It may be true that accidents increase with
the frequency of an activity, but that does not mean that
frequency decisions are a concern of tort law, for the goal of
tort law is not to reduce accidents but to reduce
unreasonable accidents-that is, accidents that can be
controlled by reasonable human effort.7 6 Tort law is
75. The reader may object that the whole purpose of strict liability is to
impose liability without fault, making my fault based analysis irrelevant. But
that misses the context of my analysis. I argued in the previous section that
imposing liability without some cogent concept of fault or responsibility is
unjustified. Here I take aim at those scholars-primarily law and economics
scholars-who believe that strict liability serves to curb faulty frequency level
decisions that cannot be apprehended by negligence liability. I argue that they
simply have not thought hard enough about the values that underlie the fault
concept. We cannot say that the purpose of the law is to provide an incentive for
actors to take reasonable precautions without also providing a normative basis
for evaluating the value of precautions. If it is important to society that
epileptics have the freedom to drive or that people not consider the legal
consequences of their choices about how often to get in their car, those values
must be taken into account before we can determine what precautions are
relevant to incentives. My argument that many frequency level decisions should
not be the source of legal responsibility is simply a specific application of the
argument that it is unjust to impose responsibility on the exercise of personal
freedom that is reasonably undertaken.
76. The same argument can be framed in terms of externalities. It is true
that choices about how frequently to drive impose external costs on othersbecause the more miles on the road the greater the likelihood of an accident.
But these external costs are offset by the external benefits of the freedom to
drive-a universal benefit-so that frequency decisions do not clearly impose
net costs on society. Professor Hylton has made a similar point by recognizing
that when the external benefits and costs of an activity are relatively equal the
law has no interest in intervening to change frequency level decisions. Hylton,
Theory & Restatement, supra note 17, at 1420; Hylton, Missing Markets, supra
note 17, at 984-86. The relative balance between external costs and benefits of
an activity suggest that the actor making the frequency decision has thought
reasonably about the impact of the decision on others. As an example, the
frequency with which a bus uses the road is likely to balance the probability of
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concerned primarily with providing a normative basis for
determining when to intervene in social arrangements by
providing a remedy when there is a sufficient link between
the injurer and the risk that another faces. But the
"sufficient link" assumes a normative basis for assessing
human behavior.
In fact, a normative understanding of accident law
shows that most frequency level decisions are not relevant
when determining legal liability. When we determine
whether a person is responsible to others for harm in an
accident, we are asking whether the person imposed undue
risks on society by preferring her own legitimate interests
over the legitimate interests of others in a way that
unreasonably denigrates the interests of others. 77 This
determination necessarily requires the law to make a
qualitative determination about the interests of the
defendant and those whom the defendant might potentially
injure. The assessment of interests is a normative-not an
empirical-inquiry, for it requires a determination of the
values that are important to society. When the interests of
the individual are trivial in light of conflicting interests, the
law makes them subservient. 78 When the interests of the
individual are also of value to society, they are given great
weight in determining what is reasonable and what is not.
The individual becomes the beneficiary of a determination
an accident-an external cost-with the probability the passengers will
enhance the value of stores along the route-an external benefit. When that
occurs, the frequency of the bus's trips is not likely to justify judicial
intervention. Interestingly, this notion that social benefits and costs of an
activity may be equal is related to the corrective justice notion that when risks
are reciprocal, liability may depend only on the care exercised. See Fletcher,
Fairness & Utility, supra note 1, at 543-56 (noting that the risk that the bus
imposes on stores along the route is reciprocated by the risk that stores impose
on buses; the bus and the stores are interdependent beneficiaries of each other's
success).
77. See generally Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in
Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1996); Ariel Porat, The Many Faces of
Negligence, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 105 (2003).
78. For example, an interest in going fast-and thereby imposing undue
risks on others-is given no value in determining whether going fast is
unreasonable, unless, of course, it is in pursuit of a broader interest, such as
taking someone to the hospital. And an interest in saving money-say, by
omitting to invest in reasonable precautions-is ruled out by the fact that
failure to invest in reasonable precautions prefers one's own welfare to the
welfare of another.
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that a certain mode of acting reflects values that are
important to social life.
We have already seen this dynamic at work in the case
of an epileptic who imposes a greater than normal risk on79
society even though he reasonably controls his disability.
Society tolerates this reasonable risk, and therefore does
not impose strict liability, precisely because we do not want
the defendant with this disability to have to worry about
legal liability every time he gets in his car. To impose strict
liability because of this disability-or "defect"-would be to
deny the person the freedom of movement that is an
essential part of human expression of capability. Instead,
we affirm that, except in special circumstances,8 0 the
frequency with which the epileptic drives is not relevant to
the determination of liability.
More generally, freedom of movement and freedom of
travel suggest that the law ought not intervene, in general,
when individuals decide how frequently to do an activity
that can be done with reasonable care.81 Here, the relevant
79. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
80. It will be recalled that if the epileptic driver decided to drive a taxi for a
living, society might well be justified in saying that the choice of that profession
was unreasonable, given the frequency with which he would then be on the road
and the other options the defendant would have to express his individuality. See
supra note 31 and accompanying text. That is, frequency level decisions might
be relevant, but when they are they can be addressed under the reasonableness
standard.
81. The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes this by providing that:
The law attaches utility to general types or classes of acts as
appropriate to the advancement of certain interests rather than to the
purpose for which a particular act is done, except in the case in which
the purpose is of itself such public utility as to justify an otherwise
impermissible risk. Thus, the law regards the free use of the highway
for travel as of sufficient utility to outweigh the risk of carefully
conducted traffic, and does not ordinarily concern itself with the good,
bad, or indifferent purpose of a particular journey. It may, however,
permit a particular method of travel which is normally not permitted if
it is necessary to protect some interest to which the law attaches a
preeminent value, as where the legal rate of speed is exceeded in the
pursuit of a felon or in conveying a desperately wounded patient to a
hospital.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §291 cmt. e (1965). As Stephen Gilles
recognized, this "is a ruling on the merits rather than a ruling that activitylevel claims lie outside the ambit of negligence law." Gilles, supra note 15,
at 340; see also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 293 cmt. b (1965) ("A car

2008]

THE DEATH OF STRICT LIABILITY

281

determination is whether the mode of acting or the mode of
decisionmaking is one that society would endorse as
important to the interrelationships that make up society or
that are important for the individual acting in a social
setting. Society endorses the freedom of mobility of the
person subject to epileptic seizures; we do not want a
person's physical disability to block access to a productive
life and we know that if we were in that person's position
we would not want our physical disability to be attended by
a legal disability-provided that we acted reasonably in
light of the disability. And we trust decisions that are
embedded in social systems that protect against abuse of
the autonomy the law values. By this reasoning
many
82
frequency level decisions are socially benign.
Accordingly, when a person decides how frequently to
go to the grocery store, we do not want or expect that
decision to be subject to social oversight through the tort
system. For one thing, we do not want that person to have
to weigh the costs and benefits of that trip from a societal
perspective to determine whether one more trip is
reasonable. We preserve the autonomy of a person to make
a private assessment of the costs and benefits of one
additional trip because to interpose societal oversight on
may be driven at fifteen miles an hour through a city street upon the least
important of errands.").
82. This general point is related to the difficulty of proving that the harm
was caused by frequency level decisions. Professor Gilles has pointed out that
even if a plaintiff could convince a court that a railroad had run too many
trains, or that the defendant had gone to the grocery store too frequently, the
plaintiff would have difficulty showing that the unreasonable activity caused
the harm. Gilles, supra note 15, at 333. He offers this as a reason to adopt strict
liability. But the difficulty of proving causation is a reason to have a no-liability
regime for those decisions. The causation difficulty reflects the fact that
ordinary people do not make decisions about how often to do something with a
view that the decision might "cause" an accident, in the sense of triggering an
accident that otherwise would not occur. If you said to the person on the street
that their trip to the store caused the harm in an accident because it was an
unnecessary trip, they would wonder what concept of causation you were using.
The fact that causation would be hard to prove simply demonstrates that when
people make decisions about how often to go to the store they are generally
unconcerned with safety matters and therefore would not understand that they
had caused any harm by the decision in the event of an accident. Causation is a
part of individual decisionmaking related to risk only when the decision being
made is thought to have an influence on the risk or outcome. People would
understand that driving too many miles and becoming tired causes an accident,
but not that making an extra trip to the store causes an accident.
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that decision would unduly burden the decision-making
autonomy of the person. This conclusion reflects the way
people normally think about such choices. When we decide
whether to make a trip to the store, we normally think not
of the risk of the trip but of the time and effort of the tripcompared to the goal of the trip.8 3 We do not want the law
to be imposing factors on decisionmaking that are not an
integral part of the decision when made outside of the
law.8 4 This congruence between common practice and the
law reinforces the normative basis of the law.
For this reason, engaging in an activity-that is, having
a frequency level above zero-is rarely an occasion for
liability in negligence. Negligence law is replete with
instances in which engaging in an activity-even an
83. As Stephen Gilles has noted,
[the] asymmetry between the courts' willingness to evaluate 'high-risk'
claims-claims that an actor negligently engaged in an activity that is
normally safe but was unsafe on a particular occasion-and their
willingness to evaluate 'low-utility' claims-challenges to an actor's
decisions to engage in an activity on the grounds that, although the
activity's utility normally outweighs its costs, on the occasion in
question its utility was so low as to require a finding of negligence.
Gilles, supra note 15, at 321. This is noticing that courts will evaluate risky
driving but not the claim that the trip should not have been made. That is
because it would unduly impinge on a person's autonomy to inquire into low
utility claims; a finding of unreasonably low utility would disable a person from
making these choices. Moreover, Professor Gilles also noted that increased
frequency of activity is often associated with diminishing marginal utility
rather than an increase in the risk of the activity. Id. at 335. Because of this,
even if an excess of risk over return might occur in a low-utility activity, the
actor is likely to curtail the activity even if the law does not make it the
occasion for liability, merely because the return to the activity decreases as
frequency increases. That makes the need for legal intervention that much less
important.
84. One can see

how the characteristic

of ordinary

decisionmaking

differentiates decisions about the quality of care from decisions about activitybased decisions. When deciding how fast to drive, we normally take into account
safety considerations, in our own interests if not in the interests of others. More
generally, decisions about quality of care are more likely than decisions about
the frequency of an activity to involve considerations of the risk of accidental
harm. Under a value-driven negligence law that reflects values actually
adopted by people in their lives, it is therefore not surprising that frequency
level decisions are often not the source of responsibility while quality-of-care
decisions are. We can note the desire to avoid having courts estimate the
"practically unknowable" benefits that parties derive from their everyday
activities, STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw 25 (1987), but
recognize that the issue never comes in a way that cannot be easily litigated.
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unlicensed or illegal activity-is not the source of liability
when harm results.8 5 And we have few instances in which
the appropriate frequency level of an activity is zero.8 6 As a
general category, frequency level decisions are not the
concern of tort law.
Could it be that frequency level decisions have unique
applicability to enterprises? After all, businesses as well as
individuals often decide how frequently to use the highways
and enterprises might well increase risks by shipping with
unreasonable frequency. Of course, when businesses make
unreasonable decisions about where or how to do business
they should be subject to liability, which is the central focus
of cases that impose negligence liability on enterprises. And
the frequency with which enterprises ship products might
be relevant to safety concerns.
Yet it is not clear why frequency decisions by
enterprises should be a general concern of the law because
it is not clear why the market does not force enterprises to
make reasonable frequency level decisions. Why, for
example, would an enterprise send out trucks with
unreasonable frequency? Ordinarily, aside from special
cases that I discuss below, an enterprise has nothing to
gain by overusing the transportation infrastructure,
because using the transportation system costs money and
the enterprise will normally want to avoid that when the
expense yields no offsetting benefit. In other words,
provided that the competitive system is functioning well,
markets impose a kind of reasonableness constraint on the
frequency of activity, putting pressure on the enterprise to
reduce the frequency of transportation to the minimum
necessary to meet the needs of customers. Unless there
were a reason to believe that an enterprise could make
money by sending out trucks more frequently than would be
reasonable from a safety standpoint,8 7 decisions that
85. This is true, for example, when the defendant should have been, but was
not, licensed to practice an activity and harms someone while engaging in that
activity. See, e.g., Brown v. Shyne, 151 N.E. 197 (N.Y. 1926) (addressing the
liability of an unlicensed chiropractor). Moreover, it is commonly assumed that
a kidnapper who gets in an accident while driving carefully after the
kidnapping is not responsible for the harm from the accident, even though his
activity level should have been zero.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 98-100.
87. Exceptions can be found in companies that charge customers more for
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enterprises make about transportation are likely to be both
cost effective-from the enterprise standpoint-and
reasonably safe. Under these assumptions, the frequency
with which an enterprise sends out trucks is not of general
importance when we think 88about an enterprise's
responsibility for accidents in tort.
The only cases in which an enterprise is not likely to
make socially appropriate frequency decisions, and thus the
only cases in which intervention is called for, is when firms
are not forced by the market to minimize their costs. If an
enterprise can increase its profits by increasing risk to
others-say by requiring suppliers to ship in their halfempty trucks-the concern for unreasonable risks may be
real. Those instances are generally easy to observe and
89
assess under the reasonableness standard.
I am not arguing, of course, that frequency level decisions
are never relevant when courts determine responsibilityonly that we cannot assume that frequency level decisions
are relevant to legal responsibility, and that in the run-ofthe-mill accident case, frequency level decisions are not
likely to be relevant. But we must notice another
characteristic of frequency level decisions that bears on the
each vehicle they send on the road. For example, cabs sometimes refuse to take
multiple parties to the same destination, preferring rather to make each party
take a separate cab. Also, one could imagine a messenger service that sent
packages out in more vehicles than necessary in order to charge senders more
for each delivery. These examples of market failure provide a basis for legal
intervention, but because they are easy to identify and assess, they do not
provide a basis for strict liability. They can be addressed under the negligence
regime.
88. By contrast, an enterprise often has a private objective that diverges
from the public interest when it comes to taking due care. The enterprise profits
if its carriers go unreasonable fast and do not get in an accident, but society
benefits if they go at a reasonable speed. This divergence between private and
public interest makes the question of due care an essential inquiry to help align
the enterprise's objectives with social objectives.
89. It is relatively easy for plaintiffs to recognize the counter-examples and
to sue the defendant for negligence. For example, if a monopolist buyer insisted
that its supplier deliver in half-empty trucks at rates that would be charged for
deliveries in full trucks, a claim that this induced too frequent use of the
roads-from a safety standpoint-could be brought by one injured in an
accident involving one of the deliveries. Because these are isolated, easily
recognized situations, we need not fear, with Shavell, that allowing courts to
intervene in such situations would also induce courts to begin mimicking
authorities that devise production schedules in a centrally planned economy.
SHAVELL, supra note 84, at 50-51.
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role of strict liability-namely, when frequency level
decisions are relevant we can apprehend their relevance
under the negligence standard. Indeed, it is common to do
so under existing law. When a person is in an accident
because the person is overly tired from driving too long, we
do not call this a frequency level case, but we have no
problem saying that the person has acted unreasonably.
And when a person dumps enough chemicals in one place to
create a hazard we need not call this a frequency level case
in order to impose liability; we simply treat it as a case of
negligence.
In short, we do not want to examine frequency level
decisions in every accident case, and certainly not in the
case of individuals and businesses going about their
activities in normal ways. Instead, we can make a
normative determination about when frequency level
decisions are relevant and when they are not by seeing
whether the law should-in light of freedom, autonomy,
and market factors-care about frequency level decisions.
And when frequency level decisions are relevant to the
determination of fault, they can easily be identified and
addressed under the reasonableness regime. As a result, we
cannot justify strict liability as necessary to interdict
frequency level decisions. Because a rule of strict liability
would impose responsibility for harm even in cases where
the activity ought not be the basis of liability, a rule of strict
liability is, to that extent, overly broad. Instead, courts
should examine frequency level decisions in particular
contexts in which the plaintiff can show that these decisions
meet the standard of unreasonableness.
D. Courts Have the Capacity to Assess the Reasonablenessof
Relevant Activity-Based Decisions
Thus far I have argued that the strict liability standard
is overly broad because it imposes liability on those who
have made reasonable activity-based decisions and because
it imposes liability when we would not want a person to be
responsible for frequency decisions. Should we nonetheless
rely on a strict liability rule-despite its breadth-because
activity-based decisions would otherwise not be subject to
judicial oversight? I think not, for one simple reason: courts
operating in the negligence regime are fully capable of
determining the reasonableness of the activity-based
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decisions that are relevant for determining fault. 90 If we
subject all relevant decisions-quality-of-care and activitybased decisions-to reasonableness standards, we fully
define the appropriate scope of responsibility for injuries
that justice requires.
1. Because Activity-Based Decisions Are Susceptible to
Comparative Analysis, They Can be Assessed under the
Reasonableness Standard. As we have seen, it is
worthwhile to distinguish between frequency level decisions
and other activity-based decisions because the former are
often not relevant to an actor's responsibility.
a. Relevant Frequency Level Decisions. Where the
frequency of the activity has normative relevance,
determining the reasonableness of frequency levels is not
unduly difficult. There are two general situations: cases
where the severity of the harm increases with frequency
and cases where the appropriate activity base is zero. 91
The severity of harm increases with frequency, for
example, where dumping waste does not pose a threat at
low levels but repeated dumping of wastes increases the
amount of harm. 92 In this kind of case, the proof of the level
of dumping at which harm occurs is difficult, but it is not
beyond the information capacities that courts normally use.
Moreover, when harm occurs of the type that would
normally occur only if the activity were repeated too often,
the existence of harm can itself be evidence that the
reasonable activity levels had been exceeded. The problems
of proof are hardly insurmountable.9 3
90. The general point was made in Gilles, supra note 15, at 320-21, and
Donohue, supra note 26, at 1059-60.
91. We earlier saw that a defendant who is subject to epileptic seizures
might be found to have acted unreasonably by deciding to become a taxi driver,
which is essentially a frequency level decision. See supra text accompanying
notes 34-37. This can be considered a special kind of frequency level decision,
but, as shown above, it is not difficult to analyze the reasonableness of this
decision.
92. See, e.g., State Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 154,
157 (N.J. 1983) (finding strict liability for dumping mercury wastes in water for
over fifty years).
93. Courts in negligence cases routinely modify the burden of proof to take
into account the difficulty of proof in light of what probably happened. For
example, where the defendant prescribed an overdose-clear activity-based
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The second class of cases-where the activity ought not
be carried out at all and no alternative exists-is more
theoretical than real. When the drafters of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability looked at this issue they
concluded that few products fit this category. 94 Nonetheless
from a theoretical standpoint it is possible that an activity's
appropriate frequency level is zero. 95 This would be true
where the value of the activity is so low and the risks of the
activity so great that the activity ought to be prohibited.
This too is achievable under the negligence standard, for
the negligence standard allows one to conclude that it is
unreasonable even to engage in the activity. 96 Although this

negligence-and the victim developed pulmonary hypertension, it was not clear
that the overdose-the unreasonable activity-caused the harm, or whether the
harm would have been caused by a regular dose. Zuchowicz v. United States,
140 F.3d 381, 387-91 (2d Cir. 1998). Nonetheless, the court easily relaxed the
burden of proving causation in order to allow the finder of fact to make the
causal determination based on their best guess about what would have
happened without the overdose. Id.
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) cmt. e, at 22
(1998) (stating that, for some classes of products, "the extremely high degree of
danger posed by its use or consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible
social utility that no rational, reasonable person, fully aware of the relevant
facts, would choose to use, or to allow children to use, the product"). The
Restatement supposes that toy guns that shoot high velocity pellets, exploding
novelty cigars, and lawn darts might fall into this category. See, e.g., Aimone v.
Walgreen's Co., 601 F. Supp. 507 (D.C. Ill. 1985) (providing such an example
with lawn darts).
95. The Restatement (Second) of Torts gives this example:

A reasonable man would recognize that there is an inescapable risk in
driving down a narrow and ill kept mountain road, winding along
precipices unguarded by walls or railings, particularly if rain, snow, or
ice has rendered the road slippery. The mere use of such a route under
the circumstances described may be negligent unless the utility of the
route is very great.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 297 cmt. a (1965).

96. This was recognized, for example, in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
where it was said that: "If the utility of the activity does not justify the risk it
creates, it may be negligence merely to carry it on, and... [strict liability] is not
then necessary to subject the defendant to liability for harm resulting from it."
Id. § 520 cmt. b. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm
admits that:
If all the risks entailed by an activity even when reasonable care is
exercised outbalance all the advantages that the defendant and all
others derive from the activity, it may be unreasonable and hence
negligent for the defendant to carry on the activity at all, or at least to
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is an uncommon conclusion, that is because most accident
cases involve products and activities with some benefits.
b. Relevant Method, Timing, and Location Decisions.
Most relevant activity-based decisions involve a defendant's
choice of location, method, or timing of operations. Because
these are comparative choices, they are subject to the kinds
of information processing that are used in quality-of-care
negligence decisions. 97 The defendant is faced with at least
two options for conducting its activities and need only
choose the most reasonable one-the option that achieves
its goals with the least risk to society. A defendant might be
faced with two routes to get hazardous wastes through a
city, or two times at which it might perform an activity, or
two methods of removing a tree. A reasonable person would
make the choice that minimizes the expected harm in light
of the benefits of each method.
Decisions like this are clearly susceptible to the kinds of
proof that courts use to decide whether the defendant acted
reasonably. 98 A court's quality-of-care decision is essentially
carry it on at the particular location. However, if defendant's decision
to engage in the activity is in fact negligent, the issue of the
defendant's strict liability recedes in importance.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20(a)-(b), at 280

(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). Courts have used the reasonableness
standard in this way. See, e.g., Moning v. Alfano, 254 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. 1977)
(allowing a jury to determine whether marketing slingshots to children was
unreasonable). Although not all courts agree. See, e.g., Bojorquez v. House of
Toys, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 483, 484-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that retailer
and wholesaler of slingshot could not be found negligent when slingshot was
used to injure child).
97. Cf. Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 141
(1989) ("The untaken precaution is the true center of specific negligence
analysis .... "). In other words, the plaintiff can simply allege that a different
method, timing, or location of the activity is an untaken precaution that made
the activity-based decision unreasonable. It is no objection that "specifying
possible options does not seem to be the comparative advantage of judges."
Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 1216. It is, of course, up to the plaintiff to give the
judge and jury information about the reasonable options that were ignored, and
to choose a level of specificity that recognizes the kinds of decisions that the
defendant made.
98. Indeed, it is difficult to distinguish between care and activity-based
decisions; even when courts concentrate on quality-of-care decisions they can
convert an activity-based decision to a quality-of-care decision. "[Wihen there
are substitutes for an activity, the decision to engage in that activity may be
seen as an 'untaken precaution' if the substitute appears less risky." Gilles,
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comparative-what could the defendant have done
differently and what effect would that have had on the
victim. The inquiry into activity-based decisions is the
same-what could the defendant have done differently and
what impact would that have had on the victim. 99 The only
difference is that one is focused on the choices the
defendant made in the care she used and the other on her
choices about the frequency, method, timing, or place of the
activity. 100 The inquiries are conceptually the same. 10'
Moreover, the appropriate level of due care often
depends on the appropriate activity-based decision-as
when a driver has been on the road a long time. In those
cases, courts routinely evaluate the defendant's activitybased choice when determining whether the defendant
exercised due care-although they rarely recognize that
this is what they are doing. 0 2 Not only does the literature
recognize that location, 0 3 timing, 04 and method decisions
supra note 15, at 331; see also Grady, supra note 97.
99. See Donohue, supra note 26, at 1059 (suggesting that a court can
determine whether defendant should have used a wrecking ball rather than
dynamite more easily than it can determine whether defendant dynamited with
due care).
100. For those who follow the analytical apparatus set up by Professor
Hylton, which focuses on activity levels by translating activities into external
costs and benefits, see supra note 17, the reasonableness inquiry asks whether
the external costs of an activity-based decision greatly exceed the benefits of
that decision. This too is a comparative analysis, for the analyst is comparing
the external costs and benefits of two states of the world-either greater or
lesser frequency, one location or another, one method versus another, or one
time of day versus another. External harm is simply a synonym for the
additional harm to the victim from one course of action over another, and that
can easily be compared with the benefits of one course of action over another.
101. The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes as much: "A negligent act
may be one which involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another (a)
although it is done with all possible care, competence, preparation, and
warning, or (b) [if due care is lacking]." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 297
(1965). Subsection (a) must be referring to activity-based negligence when due
care is taken because due care negligence is covered in subsection (b).
102. See Donohue, supra note 26, at 1060-62 (explaining that a truck driver
will find the burden of staying awake more difficult the more she drives).
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20(k)
illus., at 294-95 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) provides an example.
Moreover, the Restatement itself recognizes the relevance of activity-based
decisions:
The location at which an activity is conducted does not independently
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can be analyzed under the reasonableness standard, courts
have been doing this under the due care standard without
acknowledging it. 105
10 6
Take the famous Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.
Plaintiff sued when a soda bottle exploded in her hand from
a hairline fracture in the bottle. 0 7 The court held that
because soda bottles should not be reused without a
"commercially practicable" test that eliminated the
possibility of such hairline fractures, the jury could infer

determine whether the activity is abnormally dangerous. However, the
location frequently has an important bearing on the two criteria [that
determine whether an activity is abnormally dangerous]. For example,
the activity's location may substantially affect the magnitude of the
risk the activity entails; as noted in comment g, blasting in a developed
area of the city creates a highly significant risk in a way that blasting
on a deserted mountainside does not. As far as common usage is
concerned, location can likewise be relevant: in arid communities, it
may be a common practice for farmers to collect water for irrigation
facilities, while this would not be common in communities where the
rainfall is plentiful.
Id. at 293-94.
Moreover, the reporters note in the Restatement that "it is far from clear
that Judge Posner is correct in assuming that courts lack the ability to rule on
the reasonableness or negligence of keeping a tiger in one's back yard;" noting
also that "[t]he availability of the rule of strict liability has rendered it
unnecessary for plaintiffs to endeavor to bring negligence claims." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM 364 (Proposed Final Draft No.
1, 2005).
104. In nuisance cases, for example, "when the place, kind, or amount of
activity is an important factor in bringing about the right level of damage, it
should be part of the legal standard." LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5, at 70.
According to Professor Gilles: "Certainly this is true in nuisance law, where
courts frequently consider whether a defendant should be ordered to reduce the
scale or frequency of his or her activities to abate the nuisance." Gilles, supra
note 15, at 334.
105. In addition to the examples in this Article, consider Adams v. Bullock,
125 N.E. 93, 93 (N.Y. 1919) ("The defendant in using an overhead trolley was in
the lawful exercise of its franchise. Negligence, therefore, cannot be imputed to
it because it used that system and not another.") (citing Dumphy v. Montreal
Light, Heat & Power Co., [1907] A.C. 454 (P.C.) (U.K.)); and Tedla v. Eliman, 19
N.E.2d 987 (N.Y. 1939) (choosing to disobey statutory command to walk in
direction of oncoming traffic is excused because volume of traffic made that side
of the road an unreasonable location for walking).
106. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
107. Id. at 437.
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negligence from the explosion.' 0 8 Although this appears to
some to be a misapplication of negligence principles, 109 it is
not. The defendant had to decide between two methods of
delivery-new bottles, where the incidence of defects was
far lower, or used bottles. The court concluded that if used
bottles could not be made without the fracture the
defendant would have to use new bottles.11 0 This responds
to the common sense notion that the choice between two
methods of delivering the beverage-in either new or used
bottles-must take into account the relative incidence of
risks of each method. In the context of that case, if used
bottles could not be made safe they were an unreasonableor abnormally dangerous-choice.
Similarly, we can understand the mysteries of the
famous Bolton v. Stone"' in activity-based terms. The
plaintiff was injured when a cricket ball hit her outside the
playing field.1 12 She lost the case because the risks were so
small as to be reasonably disregarded, but the judges went
1 13
on to speak of the cricket club's general responsibility.
After indicating that the substantiality of the harm
mattered, Justice Reid said: "I do not think that it would be
right to take into account the difficulty of remedial
measures,"1 14 suggesting a kind of disproportional Hand
formula-if the risks are substantial enough the burden of
precautions is not relevant unless the precautions are
disproportionately high. He then continued, "If cricket

108. Id. at 439-40.
109. See GEISTFELD, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, at 23. Professor
Geistfeld correctly notes that "reasonable care does not ordinarily involve the
total elimination of risk," and then says that the court made the mistake of not
balancing the relevant risks and precautions when considering the use of used
bottles. Id. As explained in this Article, however, the reasonableness of using
the used bottles cannot be decided separately from considering the
substitutability of new bottles for used bottles. Once we recognize that the
defendant was not only making a decision about the risks from used bottles but
also a decision about the comparative risk of new and used bottles, we can
understand that the court was making a determination about the
reasonableness of that method-of-activity decision.

110. Escola, 150 P.2d at 439.
111. [1951] A.C. 850 (H.L.) (U.K.).
112. Id. at 851.
113. See id. at 854.
114. Id. at 867.
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cannot be played on a ground without creating a
substantial risk, then it should not be played there at
all." 115 This has been taken to be a test for negligence that
looks only at the degree of risk, and not at the
reasonableness of that risk-much like the test for
abnormally dangerous activities. 116 But it probably has a
different meaning. It looks, in fact, to be a statement that
the cricket game might have been in an unreasonable
location. As Judge Reid said, if the risks are substantial
enough-even after due care is taken-perhaps the game
should not be played "there."1 7 There is probably a more
reasonable location for the game-one where the lower
value of the location might be offset by the greater safety of
the location. This is an activity-based decision.
Finally, as soon as courts are free to do directly what
they are now doing under the guise of determining whether
to apply strict liability, courts will do a better job of making
the relevant reasonableness assessment-which is the goal
of my proposal to integrate strict liability analysis into
negligence analysis.1' 8 Once courts ask directly whether the
defendant has chosen a reasonable location for her
activities, for example, courts will develop methodologies for
evaluating that decision, will evaluate how defendant's own
studies, or lack thereof, are relevant to their determination,
will rely on academic studies about sighting decisions, and

115. Id.
116. See

WEINRIB, supra note

6, at 148-50.

117. Bolton, [1951] A.C. at 867.
118. This was the principal lesson of Judge Posner in Ind. Harbor Belt R.R.
v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990). He recognized that one
cannot tell whether strict liability should be applied without knowing whether
location decisions were reasonably made and that once one knows whether
location decisions were reasonably made, one no longer needs strict liability.
David Rosenberg has pointed out that Judge Posner needed to, and did, reverse
the district court finding that the railroad yard in a city was an unreasonable
location for transporting dangerous chemicals. Rosenberg, supra note 16, at
1210-14. But the district judge's mistake was to think that he could determine
the reasonableness of the location without looking at alternative locations for
either residences or chemical shipping. Once we focus, as Posner did, on the
alternative locations for these conflicting activities, the mistake is corrected, but
we no longer need strict liability. The district judge's mistake occurred because
the "abnormally dangerous" test points to the nature of the chemical rather
than to the issues of how and where it is shipped. Incorporating strict liability
into negligence analysis will avoid this mistake. Id.
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will begin assessing the relevance of trade custom-that is,
where the activity is commonly done. Actors will soon learn
to make better location decisions and lawyers will be able to
give their clients better advice.
2. The Negligence Standard is a Flexible Tool for
DeterminingResponsibility. Even beyond the clear ability of
the negligence standard to lead to structured determinations
about the reasonableness of relevant activity-based
decisions, the negligence standard is flexible enough to
avoid being under-inclusive. This flexibility helps overcome
two disadvantages that the negligence standard is thought
to have-namely, that it is expensive to administer
(because it requires the plaintiff to prove fault) and that it
might lead to false negatives-outcomes where the
defendant should be responsible but the plaintiff is unable
to prove it. First, the reasonableness standard is flexible
enough to recognize the many circumstances in which a
reasonable actor would, in light of the risks of her activity,
gather more information; it contains a robust duty to
investigate. Second, the reasonableness standard allows the
court to reduce administrative costs when the fault can be
inferred from the way the harm occurred.
a. Negligence and the Duty to Investigate. Accidents
often happen because of uncertainty, and one function of
tort law is to pressure actors to reduce accident costs by
acquiring the information they need to avoid or reduce
harms. In this connection, it has been thought that one
advantage of strict liability has been to induce an actor to
avoid liability by investing in information to reduce
accidents.
Thus, it has been said that:
[Although the negligence standard creates incentives to search for
methods that would avoid a negligence claim] strict liability
creates additional research incentives, because under strict
liability there is more to be gained by avoiding liability. Under
negligence, injurers are not liable for accidents that are not worth
avoiding. Consequently, injurers have no incentive to attempt to
discover cost-effective methods of avoiding these injuries. In
contrast, under strict liability .... [B]ecause injurers are liable for
those injuries anyway, discovering a cost-effective method of
reducing or eliminating the injuries they cause will redound to
their benefit .... In a sense, some of the research incentives that
strict liability may create are incentives to discover activities or
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activity-based decisions that may substitute for those 119
that
currently generate strict liability, in order to reduce net costs.

This view assumes, with unnecessary rigidity, that the
negligence standard does not interdict harms that could
have been prevented with the investment of additional
funds in safety. To the contrary, the negligence standard
has proven to be flexible enough to impose responsibility
when the relevant actor has failed to get and rely on
information that is reasonably available and that would
have enabled the actor to reduce the harm. 120
The essence of the reasonableness standard is that an
actor must look out for the welfare of others when the actor
has created a risk or stands in such a relation to the victim
that a reasonable person in that position would take pains
to consider how the victim might get hurt. 121 Under this
general concept, the reasonableness standard has long put
pressure on the defendant to reasonably investigate its own
product in order to reduce risks. Indeed, the granddaddy of
all products liability, MacPherson v. Buick,122 involved the
duty to investigate, for the alleged negligence was that the
defendant failed reasonably to investigate parts that it
bought. 123 Juries have long been allowed to determine that
the failure to investigate is unreasonable 24 and the
119. ABRAHAM, supra note 23, at 164-65; see also James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919, 92829 (1981); David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability,
33 VAND. L. REV. 681, 711-13 (1980); Steven Shavell, Liability and the Incentive
to Obtain Information about Risk, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 260-61 (1992).
120. Steven Shavell has shown how a socially beneficial level of investment
in information can be induced by either the regime of strict liability or the
appropriate negligence regime. Shavell, supra note 119. In this Article, I show
that the negligence regime is the appropriate one; an actor is unreasonable if
the actor fails to invest in information whenever the benefits of the information
outweigh the burden of getting the information.
121. See, e.g., Porat, supra note 77, at 106 (showing how the Hand formula
reflects the Kantian notion that it is immoral to prefer one's own interest in
saving money to the interests of others in avoiding harm).
122. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
123. The plaintiff alleged that the wheel's "defects could have been
discovered by reasonable inspection, and that inspection was omitted," but not
that the defendant knew of the defect or willfully concealed it. Id. at 1051.
124. See, e.g., McDougald v. Perry, 716 So. 2d 783, 786-87 (Fla. 1998)
(stating that although defendant did not manufacture the chain that might
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products liability "revolution" has continued to develop that
notion.125
With hindsight, we can see that the negligence
standard has ably performed the function that Guido
Calabresi and Jon Hirschoff would have assigned to strict
liability thirty-five years ago-namely, to identify the actor
who can acquire and disseminate information that can be
used to reduce the costs of accidents. They argued that:
[When a] producer is in a position to compare the existing accident
costs with the costs of avoiding this type of accident by developing
either a new product or a test which would serve to identify [those
who are at risk from a product] . . . the producer is the cheapest
cost avoider, the party12 6best suited to make the cost-benefit
analysis and to act on it.

That is true, but irrelevant to the function of strict
liability. Identifying the least cost avoider does not make
the liability strict; it simply makes the failure to incur the
cost unreasonable.
b. Activity-Based Decisions and Res Ipsa Loquitor.
Moreover, the reasonableness standard is also flexible
enough to reduce the administrative costs of determining
fault when those costs are unnecessary. In particular, when
the harm is of a type that would not have occurred had
decisions been reasonably made, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor allows the plaintiff to shift to the defendant the
burden of coming forward with the evidence or the burden

have been defective, the jury may find defendant liable for accident harm
because it had control of the chain and inspected it); Bethel v. N.Y. City Transit
Auth., 703 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (N.Y. 1998) (stating that although common
carrier is no longer held to utmost standard of care, jury may find defendant
bus company liable for failing to observe a defective seat during routine
maintenance).
125. See, e.g., Richter v. Limex Int'l, Inc., 45 F.3d 1464, 1471 (10th Cir.
1995) (defendant seller of trampoline as an exercise device had a duty to warn
consumers that the use of the trampoline for jogging might cause stress
fractures); Wooderson v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 681 P.2d 1038 (Kan. 1984)
(explaining that the defendant had a duty to warn consumers based on research
and scientific developments and publications in the field); see also 1 ROBERT D.
HURSH & HENRY J. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2:29, at 212
(2d ed. 1974) (duty to make tests and inspections as would be reasonably
necessary to make a safe product).
126. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 18, at 1062.
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of proof.127 This doctrine is applicable to both due care and
activity-based decisions. When the blast that is used to fell
a sixty-foot tree sends a portion of the tree 450 feet, it is not
hard to conclude that a reasonable
person would have used
28
an ax, a saw, or less dynamite.1
Even beyond formal application of res ipsa loquitor,
courts in negligence cases frequently rely on presumptions
and reduced evidentiary burdens to make sure that
plaintiffs are not denied an opportunity to prove fault
because of the circumstances in which the fault occurred.
And the negligence standard contains a built-in concept of
quasi-strict liability. When an actor acts on the basis of
specialized knowledge of the kind that makes it difficult for
courts to second guess their decisions, the law absorbs a
private standard as the standard of negligence and holds
the defendant to that standard. This gives negligence
liability the feel of strict liability without removing the
anchor of fault from the finding of responsibility. In
professional malpractice settings, this allows the court to
defer to the standard of care set by the profession while
making it a fault not to meet that standard. 129 In products
127. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 788
P.2d 726, 729-31 (Alaska 1990) (discussing a break in the city's water main and
stating that strict liability does not apply because most expected harm can be
removed by reasonable care); Dye v. Burdick, 553 S.W.2d 833 (Ark. 1977)
(applying res ipsa loquitor to a case involving a bursting dam); Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 676 P.2d 25 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (involving
transportation of natural gas and subsequent explosion); Mahowald v. Minn.
Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. 1984) (involving an explosion in the course of
transmitting natural gas); Fleege v. Cimpl, 305 N.W.2d 409 (S.D. 1981)
(involving electric water pump in river); Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Co., 746 P.2d
1198 (Wash. 1987) (involving an airplane crash); Foster v. City of Keyser, 501
S.E.2d 165 (W. Va. 1997) (involving the transmission of natural gas).
128. See Sullivan v. Dunham, 55 N.E. 923, 926-27 (N.Y. 1900) (imposing
strict liability, but referring to the "special method" the defendant used to take
down the tree); see also Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., 181 A.2d 487 (N.J. 1962)
(explaining that a rocket engine testing facility a thousand feet from the center
of a small village is subject to strict liability for compensatory but not punitive
damages). The Berg case could have been decided almost as quickly under a
negligence standard. It is hard to imagine that the location was so superior to
other locations that it was reasonable to put the testing facility so close to the
village. Indeed, the court said that the defendant could have shown "greater
care and diligence, perhaps in the selection and arrangement of the testing sites
and stands," implying that the court found the location to be unreasonable
before it applied strict liability. Id. at 496.
129. See Mitchell v. United States, 141 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1998); Complete
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liability settings, it allows the court to defer to the
producer's manufacturing standard, while making it a
fault-or defect-not to meet that standard. 130 The
negligence standard is fault-based but not toothless.
The law ought to advance with a scalpel, not a
blunderbuss. The doctrine of strict liability represents the
law's blunderbuss, scattering shot around in the hope that
the law can address activity-level decisions that are not
captured by the reasonableness standard. But the weapon
of strict liability is an unnecessary and overly broad
weapon. It is overly broad because it provides no sure way
of knowing when the blunderbuss should be pulled out and
because it punishes those who are not at fault. It chilh,
decisionmaking that is at the heart of what it means to be a
responsible person and is especially problematic when we
do not want the law to intervene to determine whether a
person undertakes an activity too frequently. Strict liability
is unnecessary because the negligence standard is fully able
to assess which activity-based decisions are relevant to the
determination of fault and that those decisions have been
unreasonably made. Judicial intervention to address
accidents ought to be the sole province of the
reasonableness standard.
In light of this conclusion, how are we to understand
the doctrine of strict liability?
E. The Outcomes in Strict Liability Cases Can Best Be
Understood as Applications of the Fault-Based Theory
That I Outline
Increasingly, the doctrine of strict liability is sustained
simply because people believe it is there. Theorists, seeking
acceptability, want their theories to describe the world as
they think it to be; they go to ingenious lengths to prove
that their theories support strict liability doctrine as we
believe it to be. Analysts, relying on the language of the
opinions, repeat what courts think they are doing rather
than determine what courts are actually doing. And courts

Family Care v. Sprinkle, 638 So. 2d 774, 777 (Ala. 1994). See generally 61 AM.
JUR. 2D Physicians,Surgeons, Etc. § 189 (2002).
130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c), at 18 (1998)

(defining manufacturing defects).
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sustain the myth of strict liability simply by doing the
relevant reasonableness analysis and then applying the
term "strict liability" to their conclusion. It looks as if strict
liability is real when it is, in fact, only a constructed reality.
In this section, I undermine the myth of strict liability
with two kinds of claims. The first is that judges deciding
the venerable strict liability cases-Rylands v. Fletcher and
the early blasting cases-could easily have reached the
same outcome under an activity-level negligence analysis.
This is covered in subsection one. My second claim is that
strict liability has eroded as a doctrinal category to the
point where it is empty. Support for strict liability is
doctrinally weak. Any expansion of strict liability beyond its
origins has hardly been uniform and the retreat from strict
liability has been palpable. In particular, it is apparent that
at least some courts use the term "strict liability" simply as
a label they apply to the conclusion that the defendant
made unreasonable activity-based decisions. As the
appropriate analytical apparatus has been revealed in the
last three decades, judges have been using it in the analysis
and disposition of "strict liability" claims, applying or
withholding "strict liability" as a conclusion, not a doctrinal
category. I expand on this point in subsection two.
1. Fletcher and the Blasting Cases. My general claim is
that courts developed strict liability because they did not
have the analytical tools to understand the intuition that
led to their decisions. In this section, I support that claim
by showing how the venerable strict liability cases involved
relevant activity-based decisions that could easily have
been found to be unreasonable.
The fountainhead case is Rylands v. Fletcher.131 Given
the uneven way that the case has been applied, 132 the case's
value as precedent is suspect, notwithstanding the case's

131. (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.).
132. See Chi. & N. W. Ry. v. Tyler, 482 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1973) (rejecting
application of strict liability); Dye, 533 S.W.2d at 883 (rejecting application of
strict liability); Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442 (1873) (rejecting the application
of Rylands to a runaway horse that caused property damage); Losee v.
Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873) (refusing to apply Rylands to an exploding boiler
that caused harm to neighbor); Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221 (Tex.
1936) (refusing to apply Rylands principle to salt water escaping from
defendant's ponds onto plaintiffs land).
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near mythic status. 133 Yet, Rylands is a decision about
unreasonable locations. The defendant constructed a
reservoir for use by a cotton mill in a district that had
previously been devoted to coal mining. 134 A latent defect
under the reservoir caused the water to run into an
abandoned mine shaft and then into plaintiffs mine.1 35 The
plaintiff mine owner could claim that the contractors hired
by the reservoir owner had been negligent, but the plaintiff
sued the reservoir owner directly, even though it could not
show that the reservoir's owner had been negligent in
choosing or supervising the contractor.136 Although the
defendant's liability might have been reached by extending
doctrines of trespass 137 or nuisance, 138 the court instead
recognized a no-fault
cause of action when the use of land is
"non-natural."1 39
The conditions that give rise to non-natural use and
liability were not explained. However, the fault-based
intuition that underlies the court's decision is not hard to
discern. The case involved a conflict between potentially
incompatible uses of land-coal mining and cotton milling.
The coal mines had been there first, making coal mining a
background fact that the defendant should have reasonably
accounted for in determining where to construct his cotton
mill. Moreover, coal mines must, by physical necessity, be
where the coal is, while cotton milling can be done in
innumerable locations. Given our current understanding of
activity-based decisions, what the court called a "non-

133. The reporter's notes to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
Physical Harm contain references to some of the articles and many of the cases
that make up the Rylands legacy. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR
PHYSICAL HARM § 20 cmt. d, at 297-99 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
134. Rylands, 3 L.R.E. & I. App. at 331.
135. Id. at 332.
136. Id. at 331-32.
137. No trespass occurred, technically, because the water had not gone
directly from defendant's to plaintiffs land; instead, the water had gone
through an intermediate property to get to plaintiffs land. See id. at 337. The
result could have been reached by extending the doctrine of trespass from direct

to indirect invasions of property.
138. Nuisance law did not provide a remedy because the harm was
accidental rather then knowing, and because the interference with plaintiffs
property was not continuing. See id. at 337-38.
139. Id. at 338-39.
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natural" use was a use in which the decision about where to
locate had to be reasonably made in light of uses of
adjoining land so that interferences were minimized. 140 And
it is not hard to see that the function of liability in this case
is to force the defendant to internalize all of the costs of the
location because that is the only way of ensuring a socially
optimal location decision.141
In other words, the origin of "strict liability" in Rylands
is fully consistent with the notion that liability serves to
force reservoir owners to think more reasonably about
their location decisions. 142 Where the land is subject to
preexisting uses, and the preexisting uses cannot be
reasonably done in another location, it seems unreasonablenon-natural-to locate a reservoir there for cotton millinga use that can be done in other locations-without being
willing to insure against harm that occurs from unforeseen
defects in the soil.
Similarly, the early blasting cases were written in the
language of strict liability but could easily have had the
same outcome under a reasonableness standard. In the Erie
Canal cases, 143 blasting might be done with due care but
with unreasonably large quantities of powder. 144 Using less

140. For similar reasons, we can relate the "non-natural use" rubric with
the more modern notion of use that is "customary" in the area. In terms of my
analysis, we can see that use of the land for storing water was not a custom in
the area because the best (and therefore most reasonable) use of the land was
for coal-mining.
141. This may be what Jules Coleman had in mind when he opined that
fault in Fletcher might be "fault merely in virtue of engaging in an activity"
rather than "fault in the way in which one engages in it." COLEMAN, supra note
6, at 368.
142. Indeed, the Restatement (Second) of Torts expressly noted that
whether reservoirs are abnormally dangerous depends on their location.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmts. i-j (1965).

143. St. Peter v. Denison, 58 N.Y. 416 (1874); Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159
(1849); Tremain v. Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 163 (1849). Ironically, while courts were
making these cases look like strict liability cases, they were simultaneously
making it clear that in analogous situations they would test the method of
undertaking an activity under a reasonable standard. See, e.g., Panton v.
Holland, 17 Johns. 92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819) (stating that a plaintiff who
challenges damage from the foundation dug by an adjourning neighbor must
prove "that the act [adopted by the defendant] was unlawful").
144. In addition, in the St. Peter case, 58 N.Y. at 416, the blasting was done
to remove frozen earth, suggesting that perhaps waiting until the next thaw
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powder per blast would have taken longer, but would also
have reduced the risk of harm. Had the court understood
this, its analysis might have been more penetrating; it
would not violate anyone's sense of justice if the court had
said that proof that the harm occurred is proof that the
defendant used an unreasonable amount of blasting
powder. Instead, the courts relied upon vague notions of
public policy to deal with conflicting rights, a sure sign that
their policy decision relied upon truncated analysis. Even
so, the opinions suggest that the courts were conscious of
the fact that the defendants had made unreasonable
decisions. 145
Other early cases are equally suggestive. In Sullivan v.
Dunham the defendant was blasting to remove a sixty-foot
tree and the blast hurled a piece of wood more than 400
feet, killing the victim. 146 Clearly, there would have been
more reasonable means of getting rid of a sixty-foot tree. In
another early case, Guille v. Swan, 147 a hot-air balloonist
landed in New York City without intending to, and the
crush of people who came to see the balloon damaged the
plaintiffs property. As Judge Posner analyzed this case in
Indiana Inner Harbor Belt Railway Co. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 148 given the little technology for controlling
hot air balloons and the little value of the defendant's
activity in New York City-the ballooning could have been
done anywhere-the decision to do the ballooning in the
city subjected the defendant to liability. It was an
unreasonable location for ballooning.
In short, the opinions in the early "strict liability" cases
could easily have been written to show that the defendant's
activity-based decision was unreasonable. The historical
might have been a reasonable alternative. In any event, the court noted that
the defendant could have avoided the damage by giving reasonable warning,
further accenting the case's reasonableness foundation. Id. at 423-24.
145. See, e.g., Hay, 2 N.Y. at 161 ("If [the defendant] cannot construct the
work without the adoption of such means, he must abandon that mode of using
his property, or be held responsible for all damages resulting therefrom."). The
terms "such means" could refer either to the amount of blasting powder the
defendant used or to the fact that the defendant had other means of removing
the rock. Id.
146. Sullivan v. Dunham, 161 N.Y. 290, 290 (1900).
147. 19 Johns. 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822).
148. 916 F.2d 1174, 1176-77 (7th Cir. 1990).
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149
support for true "no-fault" liability disappears.

2. The Modern Shift from Strict Liability to
Unreasonable Activity Liability. Outside of the venerable
cases, support for strict liability as a doctrine is weak
indeed. Strict liability is eroding even in the blasting
cases. 150 There is no uniformity of approach among the
149. Analysis also undercuts the notion that strict liability applies in the
animal cases. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm
suggests that "[a]n owner or possessor of livestock or other animals . . . that
intrude upon the land of another is subject to strict liability." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 21, at 328 (Proposed Final

Draft No. 1, 2005). This appears to be a highly truncated view of strict liability.
Aside from the fact that "strict liability" is limited by defenses of consent and
obligation, id. § 25, contributory negligence, id. § 25, and proximate cause, id. § 29,
the underlying issue in these cases is the duty to maintain fences, which
sometimes falls on the livestock owner and sometimes on the victim landowner.
See id. § 21 cmt c, at 330-33. That determination is one of duty, not of strict
liability, and it depends on the comparative costs and benefits of the two
options. The livestock cases, therefore, decide when it is unreasonable not to
build a fence; liability follows from the finding that the party with the
responsibility failed to fulfill it. This is not strict liability. Similarly, the
invocation of strict liability for wild animals is really liability for animals that
are dangerous when not reasonably controlled-"likely, unless restrained, to
cause personal injury"-and, in any event, is highly dependent on the location
of the animal. Id. § 22. The invocation of strict liability for animals known to
have abnormally dangerous tendencies relies on the knowledge of
dangerousness to prove fault and the owner's opportunity to get a less
dangerous pet to provide reasonable alternative choices. Id. § 23. The opinions
could easily be rewritten as activity-based negligence cases.
150. Blasting cases that purport to apply strict liability often appear to use
a reasonableness analysis to determine whether to apply strict liability,
rendering strict liability superfluous. See, e.g., Harper v. Regency Dev. Co., 399
So. 2d 248, 252 (Ala. 1981) (adopting strict liability but determining it
"relatively unimportant" whether or not they adopt strict liability; the "fault
concept is preserved simply by transposing the basis for testing culpability from
the degree of care exercised in the manner in which the blasting operation is
conducted to the conduct of the blaster in carrying on an abnormally dangerous
activity which subjects innocent parties to an unreasonable risk of harm").
Other cases do not hold an activity to be abnormally dangerous until it is found
to be unreasonable. See, e.g., Ballard v. Buckley Power Co., 60 F. Supp. 2d 1180,
1187-88 (D. Kan. 1999) (finding for defendant for lack of cause and thereafter
stating that plaintiff failed to produce evidence that the blasting was
abnormally dangerous "under the conditions present in this case," citing lack of
evidence of "excessive charge inappropriate to the surroundings" or "an unusual
charge"). Other cases deny strict liability in blasting cases in dicta. For
example:
Even blasting, the activity most commonly recognized as
ultrahazardous, may not give rise to strict liability if conducted in an
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various courts; for any given activity, some courts write
opinions using the language of strict liability and some do
not.151 Some jurisdictions have rejected or seriously
questioned the concept of "abnormally dangerous"
activity. 152 In other jurisdictions, blasting is "essentially the
appropriate locale far away from human habitation or anything of
value. To impose an inflexible strict liability rule on all blasting cases
without consideration of the circumstances would be just as incorrect
as [to argue that transporting hazardous wastes can never be subject to
strict liability].
Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1544 (10th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
151. Notwithstanding the analysis in the text of this Article, several cases
present isolated instances of strict liability in which neither the activity level
nor the quality of care seems to be unreasonable. Under the theory of this
Article, they are wrongly decided. Several cases involve a manufacturer's
responsibility when the harm caused by the product could not have been
reasonably known at the time the product was put on the market. See, e.g.,
Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1147 (Mont. 1997) (stating that strict
products liability makes the manufacturer responsible if,
given the information
that later developed, it would have been unreasonable to put the product on the
market without taking that information into account); Green v. Smith &
Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 750-51 (Wis. 2001) (manufacturer of latex
gloves is responsible for allergic reaction that even medical community could
not trace to the gloves). These decisions, which seem to be a part of the process
of working out the responsibility of manufacturers to investigate the potential
hazards of their products-itself an activity-based decision-are out of step with
the decisions of other courts, and are not endorsed by most commentators. See,
e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991);
Bernier v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 516 A.2d 534 (Me. 1986); Vassallo v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998) (abrogating earlier cases
prospectively); Feldman v. Lederle Labs, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984) (overruling
an earlier case); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 2(c), § 2 cmt. m (1998) ("An overwhelming majority of jurisdictions supports
the proposition that a manufacturer has a duty to warn only of risks that were
known or should have been known to a reasonable person."). Similarly, such
celebrated cases as Chavez v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Cal.
1976), seem not to fit the analysis in this Article. There a railroad was held to
be strictly liable for an explosion of the dangerous cargo the railroad was
carrying on behalf of the United States government. Id. at 1205, 1214. Yet that
case was decided primarily on the basis of the loss spreading rationale, which
provided a basis for the court to overcome the defendant's argument that
because it was required, as a common carrier, to carry the explosives, it should
not be strictly liable for the harm that resulted. Id. at 1214. The court assumed
that the cargo was ultrahazardous, so the court did not directly face the
question of why strict liability applied. And, of course, the Chavez result is not
uniformly accepted; other courts have denied liability when a common carrier is
compelled by law to accept the cargo. See Actiesselskabet Ingrid v. Central R.R.
Co. of N.J., 216 F. 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1914).
152. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20
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only activity that has been given strict liability treatment,
at least so far. ' 153 Although many jurisdictions purport to
extend strict liability beyond blasting, the approaches are
not uniform-the courts take diverse approaches even for
those activities in which the logic of the
blasting cases
54
would seem to have the most application.1
Just as important, it is evident that courts purporting
to apply strict liability often do so only after concluding that
the defendant made an unreasonable activity-based
decision. Both the facts and language of the cases suggest
that they are really activity-based negligence cases. Courts
find the activity to be unreasonable and then apply the
"strict liability" label to their conclusion. This, of course,
robs "strict liability" of any meaning or purpose.
For example, in Koos v. Roth, the court departed from
the holding in other cases 55 and applied the rhetoric of
strict liability to hold a defendant responsible when,
because of a surprise whirlwind, his controlled crop burn
got out of control and burned a neighbor's property. 156 Yet
hints of reasonableness analysis permeate the opinion. In
particular, the court did not say that the activity of
controlled burning subjects the defendant to liability.
Instead, the court talked about the characteristics of this
controlled burn, saying that "[i]t is a matter of scale as well
as location"' 57 (both activity-based factors). According to the
court: "When fire reaches the magnitude of essentially the
whole surface of a large area open to the winds, the
possibility that it will spread beyond its intended bounds
cannot be excluded with any practical degree of care."' 5 8
cmt. d, at 299 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
153. Id. at § 20 cmt. e, at 300.
154. The paradigm of the blasting cases is thought to reflect several
characteristics: (1) the defendant's awareness of the dangers of blasting; (2) the
benefits the defendant derived from blasting; (3) the existence of residual risk
even after care is taken; and (4) the absence of meaningful contribution to the
harm by the victim. One commentator had expressed surprise about how little
this paradigm has been applied. See Jones, supra note 10, at 1726-49.
155. See, e.g., Boynton v. Fox Denver Theatres, 214 P.2d 793 (Colo. 1950)
(involving spread of trash fire); Miller v. Sabinske, 322 S.W.2d 941 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1959) (involving spread of open field fire).
156. Koos v. Roth, 652 P.2d. 1255 (Or. 1985).
157. Id. at 1265.
158. Id. Koos provides the support for an illustration in the Restatement
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Not only was the court influenced by the magnitude of this
burn, which might easily be said to be unreasonably largegiven the ability to confine the burn to smaller sections of
land-but the court might also have been influenced by the
existence of alternatives to the controlled burn as a way of
159
clearing fields.
Similarly, in Schwartzman, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railway Co., chemicals used in a wood treatment
plant leaked into the ground, damaging a neighbor's
property. 16 0 In departing from decisions in other states and
imposing strict liability,16' the court emphasized the
plaintiffs allegations of a "high degree of significant risk of
harm posed by Defendant's hazardous waste activities,
certainly not a matter of common usage, conducted in close
proximity to residential areas and municipal ground
wells."'162 If we can assume that wood treatment facilities
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm that itself reflects the activitybased characteristics of the controlled burn cases. The illustration itself
mentions the "size of such fires" as contributing to the substantial harm to the
neighbor. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20
cmt. h, at 290 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
159. See generally Kathyrn V. Fields, Note, Field Burning: New Tinder for
the Flame of Strict Liability, 19 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 767 (1983). The court in
Koos emphasized the element of choice by noting that defendant could "choose
whether or not to chance the potentially costly consequences." Koos, 652 P.2d at
1262.
160. Schwartzman, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 842 F.
Supp. 475, 476 (D.N.M. 1993).
161. See, e.g., Sealy Conn., Inc. v. Litton Indus., 989 F. Supp. 120 (D. Conn.
1997) (stating that, when handling of hazardous wastes is only incidental to
manufacturing activities, the manufacturer is not subject to strict liability).
Courts do not generally apply strict liability when companies generate wastes
as a byproduct of the manufacturing process, but sometimes do apply strict
liability to companies that handle other people's waste. This shows that
something other than the mere dangerousness of the activity is going on; it is
hard to see how toxic wastes are less dangerous in the hands of those who
create them than in the hands of those who dispose of them. If "abnormally
dangerous" was something about the dangerousness of the chemical, the same
rule should be applied to both types of waste. The distinction is relevant to a
reasonableness analysis, however, because the reasonableness of the location of
the waste may be different if waste is a byproduct than if waste is the product
itself. The reasonable location for the plant that generates the waste will be
influenced by considerations related to the location of the primary product, not
just the dangerousness of the waste, while the location of the waste as a product
is likely to involve only a consideration of the best location for the waste.
162. Schwartzman, 842 F. Supp. at 478-79.
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can be located anywhere, then locating them "in close
proximity to residential areas" was unreasonable.
Another case that invokes strict liability where
reasonableness analysis could have achieved the same
163
outcome is Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil PurchasingCo.
One defendant tried to dispose of hazardous waste by
incineration but its incinerator was not up to the task. 164 It
then hired another (inexperienced) defendant to get rid of
the waste, and the second defendant did this by putting the
highly corrosive chemicals into metal pipelines. 165 The
evidence showed that other companies generally dispose of
this kind of waste by deep-sea disposal, deep-well injection,
and on-site incineration. 166 Given the risky option chosen by
the defendant in the face of good options, the court could
easily have said that both defendants
made unreasonable
1 7
choices about which method to use.
Finally, in Luthringer v. Moore, the defendant
exterminator used a gas to get rid of roaches in the
1 68
basement of a building with many commercial tenants.
The court's opinion focused on the circumstances that led to
the release of the gas, including the fact that liquid
pesticide was a less useful but safer alternative to the gaswhose advantage was that it penetrated through walls.
Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to believe that
the use of gas instead of the liquid was unreasonable.
In sum, the doctrine of strict liability arose in cases in
which the defendant made unreasonable activity-based
decisions. That doctrine served a useful function when
courts could not identify how to evaluate the reasonableness
of activity-based decisions, but it has now outlived its
usefulness. Tort doctrine would be more meaningful and
analysis more direct if the label were dropped completely
and courts relied explicitly on reasonableness analysis.

163. 678 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1982).
164. Id. at 1298.
165. Id. at 1299.
166. Id. at 1297.
167. See id. at 1307-09.
168. Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1948).
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II. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL REASONING

The doctrine of strict liability exists because we believe
that it exists. And we believe that it exists because courts
lacked an analytical basis for understanding that even
when an injurer exercises due care the injurer may make
unreasonable choices about where, when, how, and how
often to undertake an activity. Strict liability is a doctrine
that was invented out of necessity to make up for the
analytical deficiencies of our earlier view of how to think
about accidental injury. To be sure, no-fault liability is
theoretically possible and some cases have held the
defendant responsible even though the defendant has
exercised due care, but those cases could have been decided
the same way using an activity-based reasonableness test.
Courts and commentators made up the notion of
"abnormally dangerous activity" without realizing that the
term actually means activity that is done with reasonable
care but in an unreasonable place or time or with an
unreasonable method or frequency.
The doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activity then took on a life of its own. Courts and
commentators began to bend theory to fit the doctrine as we
believed it to be rather than to recognize that the "strict
liability" cases were really fault-based cases of a different
kind. Soon it was commonly believed that the negligence
standard was incapable of detecting unreasonable activitybased decisions, that an injurer's frequency of activity was
always subject to oversight, and-much the same thingthat all external costs of an activity ought to be
internalized. These were, to my mind, analytical mistakes
made to support a non-existent doctrine.
We are left to speculate about what this analysis means
for our concept of legal reasoning and the craft of judging.
What are we to learn about legal reasoning from this
example of doctrine-the doctrine of "abnormally dangerous
activity"-that is misleading and analytically empty? When
the outcome of cases appears to be correct, but the
explanation for the outcome is analytically empty, what
does this say about the craft of legal reasoning?
In fact, it appears that legal reasoning too quickly
grasps at superficial and analytically empty concepts in
order to mask the fact that judges often decide cases
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without a full analytical justification for the outcome. In its
ideal state, the concept of legal reasoning assumes that the
outcome of a case is derived from a process of thought that
can be articulated and specified. That is, the concept of
legal reasoning assumes that judges have a process for
thinking about the problem presented in a way that directs
them from an understanding of the values that they must
consider to the outcome they reach. It assumes that the
outcome is determined by the reasoning they use and that
judges can explain their reasons in their opinions, that
their thinking is transparent. But that has not been the
case in the "abnormally dangerous" context. The reasons
have been superficial and vacuous, mere labels for outcomes
rather than guides to analysis.
Instead of legal reasoning of the type just described, in
the case of "abnormally dangerous activities," judges appear
to have decided cases on the basis of intuitions about
justice-that is on the intuition that some actors who have
taken due care should nonetheless be responsible for the
harm they have caused. To be sure, these intuitions are
informed by prior cases and unarticulated notions of
fairness and equality, but they have hardly been the kind of
articulated justification for replacing the negligence
standard that reveals the basis on which the decision was
reached. 169 The fact that judges supply reasons for their
decision does not necessarily mean that reasoning directed
them to the outcome they reached. Depending on the nature
of the reasons they give, judges could easily give reasons for
an intuitional decision that occur to them only after the
outcome has been determined.
In this respect, the concept of legal reasoning exploits

169. The difference between determinate reasoning and intuition is a
matter of degree, of course. At one extreme we could imagine that a judge flips a
coin to get a result, thus violating the assumption that the judge reasoned to
the result, although there may be reasons to flip a coin as a mode of decision. At
the other extreme, we could imagine a judge who starts with the problem before
him and adopts a well-structured line of analysis that would identify the values
that are at stake in the dispute, and the precise way those values should be
considered in the context of the case in order to reach a result. The crucial issue
is whether the way judges decide cases guides them from the problem to the
outcome or whether they feel their way to the outcome without carefully crafted
modes of analytical reasoning. But a theory of legal reasoning that does not
demand as much analytical specificity as the problem warrants is settling for
explanations rather than justifications.
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an ambiguity in words like "reasoning" or "explanation" or
"justification." Judges supply reasons, of course. But they
could supply reasons in the sense of "here is the best
explanation I can give for what I decided" rather than
reasons in the sense of "here is the thought process I used
to come to the decision that I reached." Explanations will
not be justificatory if the explanation does not include a
meaningful statement of the normative basis for preferring
one outcome over another that allows the analyst to
determine both what values are being advanced by those
decisions and how those values will be evaluated in related
cases. Legal reasoning has always required explanations
but has not always required justifications. And legal
reasoning has therefore been satisfied with superficial
explanations for outcomes that are intuitionally correct but
analytically vacuous. By definition, a statement of reasons
that seeks to justify a decision reached on intuition cannot
explain the thought process that led to the decision, for
there was no such thought process. It can therefore meet
neither the test of determinacy-since it does not reveal an
analytical thought process-nor the test of transparencyfor the statement of reasons does not reveal that the
decision was reached before the reasoning was done.
The notion that cases are decided by something called
legal reasoning is supported by the associated assumption
that the language used to explain the law has meaning, or
at least a meaning that is useful in understanding how the
law gets from a statement of the problem presented by a
case to a statement of the outcome of the dase. But this
association between conceptual language and legal
reasoning assumes that the language judges use to express
their reasoning has some meaning that can be ascertained
and that this meaning guides the development of the
decisionmaker's thinking from problem to outcome.
Consider the following two statements:
*"To inflict this injury on the plaintiff without
compensation would be unfair."
*"To inflict this injury on the plaintiff without
compensation would be blyczh."
The first statement seems to be a statement of reasons,
the second does not. But that is only because a word such as
"fair" purports to have some content, while the made-up
word "blyczh" obviously does not have content. If the word
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"fair" has no known or decipherable meaning-or worse, if
it has multiple meanings-then the two statements are
functionally equivalent, and neither provides a reason for
the decision-in terms of describing the thought process
that is used to reach the decision. And that is true even if
the word "fair" expresses only an intuition that was used to
decide the case. An unexplained or unexplored intuition is
not a basis for legal reasoning unless the intuition is
identified as such-to meet the transparency requirementand is accompanied by an initial justification for believing
that the intuition comports with some relevant justification
for the legal intervention-to meet the determinative and
normative requirements. By definition, unadorned intuition
is never an apt description of a thought process used in
reaching a decision.
The link between the content of words and decisional
intuitions is clear. After Rylands v. Fletcher, a landowner is
sometimes responsible for damage done to a neighbor's
property and sometimes not. When the court in Rylands
said that the landowner is legally responsible if the owner's
use of the land is "non-natural" the court gave a reason
without analytical content. The concept of non-natural does
not begin to point to the factors that are relevant to
determining responsibility; it is a mere label attached to an
intuition that needs to be explained-a categorical
conclusion if you will. And the reference to "natural" could
be taken in either a deontological sense-as in natural
law-or in an economic sense-as in the most efficient use.
This usage supplies an explanation without a justification.
If the basis of a decision is intuition, not reason, then it
would be natural to use words-like "fairness" or "nonnatural"-that appear to have content but do not.
The fault is not with the judges, who do the best they
can with the analytical apparatus that is available to them.
The fault instead is with the theory of legal reasoning,
which overemphasizes the amount of reasoning that goes
into decisions and pretends that by using words to explain
their decisions, judges have justified their decisions. 170
170. A tension undoubtedly exists between the desire to support the
legitimacy of the law by emphasizing that it is based on legal reasoning and the
frank admission that many judicial decisions have a high degree of intuitional,
non-analytic content. In the desire to make legal reasoning look to be a selfcontained and coherent system, legal reasoning has tolerated the use of words
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Legal reasoning cannot achieve its ideal, which is to reveal
the analytical justification for the outcome of a case, if it
continues to satisfy itself with non-justificatory explanation
and with words that have little justificational content. The
death of strict liability is not only a corrective to
unworkable doctrine; it is also a reminder that legal
reasoning-that is, the reasons that the law provides for
one outcome over another-may not advance justificational
analysis. What matters is not necessarily what the court
said it was doing but what the court did-the outcome, not
the description of the outcome. The words used in opinions
should be taken as placeholders for deeper justificational
analysis until the analytical meaning of the words is fully
understood.
CONCLUSION

Strict liability is dying because the analytics of accident
law have shown that strict liability is the wrong container
for understanding what courts are, and should be, doing
when they assess responsibility for harm. Fault-based
liability is the only justifiable basis for assigning
responsibility and courts can use the fault concept to
vindicate fully the important values that strict liability
would legitimately vindicate.
In fact, outside of theories of distributive justice, we
have no theory of strict liability. No theory of personal
responsibility explains why a person who is not at fault in
some relevant sense should be responsible for another's
misfortune. No such theory explains why a person should be
responsible for residual harm-that is, for harm that
cannot be addressed through human ingenuity-just as no
theory explains why one person should be responsible when
lightning strikes another. To the contrary, not only would
holding a person responsible under these circumstances
deny the human agency involved in acting and deciding-by
making acting and deciding irrelevant to responsibilitybut it would also reduce an actor's freedom of activity. This
normative point-which is the basis for withholding
liability from a person who has taken reasonable
precautions-provides a moral and consequentialist basis
for withholding liability from a person who has also taken
and doctrine that is non-justificational.
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reasonable precautions in deciding where, when, how, and
how frequently to undertake an activity.
Theories that purport to support strict liability are in
fact only theories about the supposed deficiencies of the
fault regime-supposed problems of proof, cost, or mistake.
The "theory" of strict liability is not about human
responsibility but about institutional deficiency. Such
theories misunderstand the genius and flexibility of the
fault-based system. Fault is a measure of, and a limitation
on, responsibility because it is a measure of human
potential-both fulsome and limited. Fault reflects those
aspects of human achievement that allow us to control our
environment while simultaneously recognizing our limited
ability to control our environment. We are not prescient,
omniscient, or completely altruistic, even though we are
smart, thoughtful, and understand the importance of
sacrifices for the community. The fault system is not static
or one-dimensional. It assigns responsibility based on
relationships between the injurer and the victim to better
accommodate the interests of both. As it has developed, the
fault-based system holds the actor responsible for not
accepting duties toward a relevant community, addresses
human decisions that fail to protect the rights of the
community, and adjusts easily to problems of proof and
evidence.
Not only is the distinction between dangerous and
abnormally dangerous activities not workable, it is not one
that courts use. Many courts have intuitively understood
that "strict liability," as applied, is just a species of fault
liability, focusing on whether the injurer has made
unreasonable decisions about the frequency, location,
method, or timing of her activity. In this respect, "strict
liability" is an analog to regular negligence liability,
providing a theory of responsibility for harm that is parallel
to the responsibility for not being careful.
all
accident
cases
should
be
Accordingly,
reasonableness cases, with a court inquiring into whether
the injurer made reasonable decisions about the quality of
care in the activity and about the frequency, location,
timing, and method of the activity. Where reasonable
people would not think that the frequency of activity should
make a difference-that is, where society does not want
people to take frequency into account-there should be no
inquiry into the frequency of the activity. Where the risk of
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harm from the activity is not likely to vary with the location
of the activity, no location-reasonable inquiry needs to be
made. Where no reasonable person would think to trade-off
one method of achieving a goal for a different method of
achieving that goal, then no method-reasonable inquiry
needs to be made. And where changing the time at which
an activity is undertaken would not reduce harm, then no
time-of-activity inquiry needs to be made. But in other
cases, the plaintiff should be free to allege and prove that
the defendant-even while exercising reasonable caremade unreasonable decisions about the frequency, location,
method, or timing of activity.
Merging strict liability into negligence liability would
make tort doctrine coherent, predictable, and normatively
sound. It would put courts in the position that they should
be in: to develop tools for assessing wrongdoing and
responsibility that make accident law an organic whole.

